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CHAPTER I 
PREAMBLE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of research studies that focus on Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
have been done by many researchers, including academician, economist, and others social 
enthusiasts from around the world. These huge interests in SMEs may come from its 
immune from economics turbulence by having production flexibility (Berry, Rodriguez, 
Sandee, 2002) and have long been believed to be important in supporting economics 
development within a country (e.g.  Akhtar, 1997;  CDASED,  1999; Mazzarol, Volery, 
Doss, & Thein, 1999). Moreover, Bianchi and Bivona (2000) also saw that the importance 
of such firms in today’s economy has been widely recognized, both concerning the number 
of SMEs, which constitute the backbone of our economic systems, and with regard to their 
contribution to Gross National Product (GNP) and employment. To support their 
statement, they gave an example of the SMEs’ importance role in Europe and USA. For 
Europe, it has been demonstrated that very small firms (i.e., those having less than 100 
employees) represent 99.4% of the European Union (EU) total businesses and employ 
56.2% of the total workforce (Tagliacarne Institute, 1995). For the USA, the significance 
of small firms also emerges from U.S. statistics, where they account for about 40% of the 
GNP and 60% of the workforce (Lumpkin & Ireland, 1988).   
SMEs in Indonesia, according to Tambunan, are very important in employment 
creation and are important sources of economic growth and foreign currencies (Tambunan, 
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2005) although, there is an ambiguous definition on SMEs in Indonesia (Sandee and 
Rietveld, 2000). The definition of SME in The Indonesian Government Law in UU 
No.20/Th. 2008 is defined as all of enterprises, which include 95% of all enterprises, 
involve ownership by an Indonesian and a total net asset value not exceeding Rp 10 billion 
and a revenue not exceeding Rp.50 billion a year. Meanwhile, Central Statistical Bureau 
(BPS) used term to define Small-Scale & Micro Establishment Statistics (SMES) limited 
only on the establishment without having legal entity, which covers all economic activities 
except agriculture. Specifically, for industrial activities can be classified into two 
categories, namely the establishment having 1-4 employees, i.e. cottage industry; and the 
establishment having 5-19 employees, i.e. small industry. The detail variation in the 
definition can be seen on the Table IV.1 p. 69 in the next chapter.  
The data figure from BPS also showed the importance of SMEs in Indonesia. In 
year 2007, Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grown 6,3 percent year on year 
basis. In detail, in terms of business scale contribution to the GDP’s growth; small and 
medium enterprises’ (SMEs) was 6,4% and large enterprises (LEs) was 6,2%. In previous 
year, SMEs’ contribution to GDP only 5,7% and LEs’ only 5,2%. In the year of 2008 
Indonesia’s GDP reaches Rp. 3.957,4 trillion in which SMEs contributes Rp. 2.121,3 
trillion or almost 53,3% from total GDP. This growing GDP occurred in all SMEs sectors. 
The highest growth occurred in the construction sector with 9,3% growth than followed by 
commerce, hotels and restaurant sector with 8,5% each and 7,8% of growth in the mining 
sector. Total SMEs (including micro enterprises) establishment in 2007 is 49,8 million 
business unit or 99,99% of business unit establishment in Indonesia, which employed as 
many as 91,8 million people or 97,3% of total employment in Indonesia. Export value from 
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SMEs’ product in the year 2007 worth of Rp. 142,8 trillion or 20% of total export from 
nonoil and gas sector which worth of Rp. 713,4 trillion. In terms of fixed asset investment 
(FAI) value in same year, SMEs invest worth of Rp. 462,01 trillion or 46,96% from total 
FAI in Indonesia during the year.  
However, according to Tambunan, SMEs in Indonesia have historically been the 
main player in domestic economic activities, especially as a large provider of employment 
opportunities, and hence a generator of primary or secondary sources of income for many 
households. Nevertheless,  compared  with many  others,  especially  more  developed  
economies,  Indonesian  SMEs  are  not  yet  contributing significant value added to the 
national economy. Instead, they have been more important as the locus of most 
employment (Tambunan, 2007).    
Excluded micro enterprises, growth of small enterprises (SEs), medium enterprise 
(MEs), and large enterprise (LEs) can be seen on the Table II.1 p.10 in the next chapters. 
Overall, from the year of 1999, the growths of each enterprise category are impressive until 
2006 and not that impressive anymore in the year of 2007 and 2008, which declined 
sharply.  
OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis has three objectives that will be discussed in the next three chapters. In 
brief, the first aim is to explore the dynamics of the available data of SMEs and LEs in 
order to understand its dynamic behavior; to theoretically search and simulate the 
underlying causal effect. The second aim is to propose policies such as; first, from 
operational side: providing market information in order to give more understanding on 
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market demand and market capacity. This strategy will in the long term lead to a better 
production planning. Second, from the financing side: using profit sharing principle of 
financing (PSP). The third aim is to explore the dynamic complexities to enable such 
policies based on the policy cycle model of public policy making. 
WRITING SYSTEMATIC 
 
This thesis will present discussion into three chapters. The first chapter will be 
dedicated to give general overview of the thesis about the importance and current condition 
of SMEs in Indonesia; thesis’ objectives and writing systematic. The next chapter will 
present the exploration of the current dynamic behavior of the SMEs number. Specifically, 
this chapter will present the unsustainable development of SMEs in terms of its quantity, 
which have a rapid increment and then followed by the rapid decrement on all categories of 
the enterprises, i.e. small, medium, and large. Such development of the SMEs number is 
called “overshoot and collapse” behavior in the system dynamics literatures. Theoretically, 
this chapter tries to search and explain the cause of the dynamics by collecting and 
analyzing the event along the period of the prior the shocks (before 2005/2006) and the 
event along the aftershock period. Causal effect relation series between variables will be 
explained with causal loop and stock and flows diagram. Some assumption and 
quantification will be taken in order to be able to mimic the reference data and then the 
result will be statistically tested.  
In the third chapter will be discussed about two proposed policies that could 
support an effort to avoid the unsustainable development of SMEs. First policy is related to 
production coordination among SMEs in the local or national level. Successful production 
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coordination can be achieved by providing SMEs updated and accurate information about 
the market. The second proposed policy is related to the use of profit sharing principle 
contract between capital owner and entrepreneur. The work of two proposed policies to 
support the sustainable development of SMEs will be described in the form of causal effect 
relationship. The advantage of the proposed policies is shown by comparing the simulation 
result to the former chapter’s simulation result.  
The fourth chapter will present complexities that might emerge in the interactions 
of actors’ behaviors in the policy development process to enable the proposed policies in 
the second chapter using the policy cycle model. Complexity in this chapter will be 
explored in the form of causality relationships among the relevant variables or actors. 
Motivation to explore complexity by such form is based on Sterman’s argument about 
complexity that the most complex behaviors usually arise from the interactions (feedbacks) 
among the components of the system, not from the complexity of the components 
themselves (Sterman, 2000). The interaction among the components will be explained 
through the policy cycle model perspective, stage by stage since it has five (5) stages to 
complete the cycle (Bridgman and Davis, 2000; Edwards, 2001). 
The last chapter will be allocated for the conclusions drawn from discussion of the 
three papers in the second, third, and fourth chapter. The conclusions will draw back your 
attention to the objectives of the thesis 
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CHAPTER II 
USING SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH TO UNDERSTAND 
IMPACTS OF CASH AND IN-KIND TRANSFER POLICIES TO 
SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES: A LESSON FROM 
INDONESIA1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents the latest quantity data from the Central Bureau of Statistics of 
Indonesia (BPS) regarding the trend number of small, medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
large enterprises (LEs) in Indonesia from year 1999 until 2008 that are behaved 
dynamically. The discussions will be focused on SMEs rather than LEs. In the early period, 
the number of those business units for all categories shows more or less a linear trend. 
Then started in 2003, it seems to have a very high spike followed by a very drastic 
decline until the end of 2008. The kind of behavior is so called ‘overshoot and collapse’.   
  System dynamics approach is applied to understand this behavior. By using this 
approach, such behavior could be well duplicated. Some relevant variables included in the 
simulation model are potential demand, aggregate demand, and quantity of SMEs and 
LEs. The behavior of SMEs’ and LEs’ quantities was regarded as the reference data. 
Comparison and statistical test were performed to see the representativeness of the model 
developed. The tests were based on a shorter period before the shock; from 1999 to 2004 
and longer period to capture such behavior; from 1999 to 2008.   
This paper also discusses most possible implemented policies, which caused 
overshot and collapse behavior on the system. The implementations of cash and in kind 
transfer policies by government and politicians on the year 2003 to 2009, in the short term, 
were followed by the increasing aggregate demand and the quantity of SMEs and LEs but 
not for in the longer term. Based on the model simulation, the quantity of SMEs in 
Indonesia will be very hard to reach the same quantity as the year 1999 even though in the 
far forthcoming years.  
 
Key words: Small Medium Enterprise, Cash and In-Kind Transfers Policies, System 
Dynamics 
 
                                                          
1
 The paper has been presented at The 3rd Indonesia International Conference on Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship, & Small Business (IICIES 2011) July 25-28, 2011 Bandung, Indonesia 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have very important roles in economic 
development.  Some of these roles are as significant contributor to gross domestic 
production (GDP) and employment creator. According to The Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS) Indonesia’s reports, as of 2006, SMEs (including micro enterprises) contributed 
53.49% to GDP and employed 85.4 million people (96,2% of total employment). In the 
year of 2007, SMEs including micro enterprise contributed 56.23% to the GDP meanwhile 
large enterprises (LEs) contributed 43.77%. And for 2008, Indonesia's GDP reaches 
Rp. 4.696,48 trillion in which SMEs contributed 55.56%.  
In the past 10 years, despite their significant role for national economic 
development, the total number of SMEs has a dynamics trend.  From 1999 to 2003, SMEs’ 
quantity continues to increase with a minor oscillation. However, this positive trend does 
not appear sustainable since it grows up rapidly from 2003 to 2006 and then followed by a 
drastic decline from 2007 to 2008.  
This paper aims to; 1) study the dynamics trend of SMEs’ and LEs’ quantity, 2) 
reveal underlying causal effect relationships of the dynamics trend, 3) identify possible 
implemented policies that caused the dynamics, 4) see the impacts of the identified policies 
on SMEs and LEs. 
The discussions on this paper will be divided into several parts. The first part 
reviews on the data and its trend during the observation period. The second part reveals 
and explains causal relationships between variables as the dynamics hypotheses. The third 
part explains some assumptions and considerations to set up initial conditions to run model 
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simulation. The next part is dedicated to test the model such as comparison test to see 
intuitively the differences behavior between reference data and simulated data; tests are 
also conducted statistically to see variations and means between the two data. The last part 
is contained conclusions and implications for further research. 
 
DATA 
 
Observation on the available data trend in this study is based on the quantity of 
SMEs starting from 1999 to 2008 regardless how the categorization is made. The 
transformation process based on attributes from one category to another is beyond this 
study. The attributes to make categorization such as number of labor employed, annual 
sales, and assets were considered to have attached automatically at the quantity of business 
units when the categorization is measured and surveyed by the data provider.  
Reasons for observing this period are: 1) there is a dynamic trend in term of 
quantity of SMEs and 2) some policies were implemented during that period. In the 
mentioned period, the data for SMEs and LEs show a small growth at the beginning then 
increase sharply in the middle and severely decrease at the end of period. The decrease 
made the quantity of SMEs is fewer than the beginning period. However, the decrease did 
not make the quantity of LEs is fewer. For detail, see Table II.1. 
Table II.1: Number of Small, Medium, and Large in Indonesia from 1999 to 
2008 
 
Year (end) Small Medium Large 
1999              774,912*                          52,214                      1,885  
2000              791,488*                          54,632                      1,973  
2001              795,262*                          51,227                      1,807  
2002              833,168*                          58,992                      2,074  
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Year (end) Small Medium Large 
2003              869,398*                          59,580                      2,169  
2004              893,250*                          66,318                      4,068  
2005              962,141*                          95,855                      6,811  
2006           1,917,897                       114,687                      4,398  
2007+              498,565                          38,282                      4,463  
2008+              520,221                          39,657                      4,372  
 
Source: BPS and the Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (Appendix 1) 
Note: 
* author’s estimation based on the average growth of micro and small enterprises 
+ Preliminary data 
 
 From 2005 to 2006, a significant increase can be seen on Table II.1, for small and 
medium enterprise category which are respectively 962,141* units to 1,917,189 units and 
95,855 units to 114,687 units. Then in 2007, they drop to 498,565 units and 38,282 units. 
Another case, the number of LEs has increased significantly a year before the SMEs’ 
increment, i.e., 4,068 units in 2004 to 6,811 units in 2005. Then in 2006, it decreases to 
4,398 units. That data trend shows a shock on the quantity of SMEs and LEs in Indonesia 
(see In Figure II.1). It is looked obvious that the shock has been started in 2003 for LEs 
category. Shock for the others two categories are started in mid-2003. 
Figure II.1: Overshoot and collapse pattern of SMEs and LEs quantity 
 
  
Source: BPS and the Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises
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The trend pattern in Figure II.1 is referred as overshoot and collapse behavior in 
the system dynamics literatures (see: Barlas, 2004; Breierova, 1997; Sterman, 2000). Such 
behavior is usually caused by an excessive and rapid utilization of strategic resources 
(aggregate demand) by the relevant parties (SMEs and LEs) in a system at the beginning 
period. The resources utilization is accelerated by the increasing number of new players to 
fulfill available space in system carrying capacity. Then along with the carrying capacity 
reduction, the competition to access the strategic resource is harder. This situation 
encourages players who are unable to compete to get out from the system. 
  
DYNAMIC HYPOTHESES  
 
 
 Tambunan had revealed in his research that unfortunately there  is  no  data  
which  can  show  whether  the transformation process or size upgrading has happened 
within SMEs, i.e. MIEs becoming SEs, SEs becoming MEs, and MEs being transformed 
into LEs.  This transformation process of firms by size may show a better picture about 
long-term entrepreneurship development (Tambunan, 2007). Thus, the hypotheses of this 
study are developed based on understanding that the quantity of new SMEs and LEs are 
equal to a fraction of current SMEs and LEs each year. 
And an assumption on transformation process has to be taken from one category 
to another category as follow; the 'small' business category will grow and transform to be 
'medium' scale business category and then the 'medium' business category will be a 
stepping stone for ‘small’ category enterprises to be categorized as ‘large’ enterprises. On 
the other way around, failed ‘large’ enterprises will be scaled down only into the 'medium' 
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category, as well as the failed 'medium' category will be out from the ‘medium’ category 
into the 'small' category. 'Small' category enterprises will get out from the ‘small’ category 
when they are failed to the smaller category (micro). ‘Micro’ business unit category is not 
included in the model. In the real life, there is surely a possibility for an enterprise to face 
an extra ordinary situation or to take a managerial decision concerning infestation thus is 
qualified to a complete liquidation. However, this possibility is not covered in this paper 
due to a very rare occasion. In a simple view, the dynamic hypothesis of this paper can be 
seen in Figure II.2 below: 
 
Figure II.2: Simple dynamic hypotheses of enterprises transformation process 
 
   On the Figure II.2 also can be seen how the transformation growth process can 
happened from small category into groups of medium category and large enterprises 
category.  Similarly, the transformation process for a failed enterprise can happened from 
large to medium scale companies and small. Figure II.2 is actually part of Figure II.3 
below. In Figure II.3, the dynamics hypotheses are described in more detail. 
Initial condition for the market capacity is assumed in equilibrium. However, the 
size is dynamically influenced by level of demand fulfillment and the average production 
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of the companies in all categories. The greater the demand fulfillment will create more 
room in the total market capacity. The creation of empty space in the market capacity is 
possible because the incumbent company is not easy to make adjustment in production, 
thus allowing new players to enter. The rate of demand fulfillment is influenced by the 
total number of firms and firms’ average production per year as well as effect of the total 
average demand on normal demand fulfillment per year. These causal relationships will 
form a reinforcing loop (R1). 
Total market capacity is influenced by consumer demand, growing demand will 
make market capacity increased (Caree, 1999). Increased in demand is as a result of greater 
new demand than the level of fulfilled demand or sales. On the other hand, the reduced 
demand caused by the rate of demand fulfillment—can be said ‘sales’ from company point 
of view is greater than the rate of new demand. Increment on the total demand for products 
of SMEs and LEs will make ‘Effect on Normal Demand Fulfillment’ increase. In the end, 
this increment will also make the rate of demand fulfillment increase; therefore, in theory 
the number of demand will be reduced. These causal relationships will form a closed 
balancing loop (B1). 
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Figure II.3: Generic system causal loop diagram 
 
 
Generally, the quantity of business units who enter and exit can be estimated by a 
fraction of the total number of business units that are currently exist. In other words, the 
number of business units are influenced by the fraction, the higher the fraction, the greater 
the net growth. Net growth is also influenced by the size of the effective fraction of 
bankruptcy. The higher number of companies is in bankrupt, the smaller net growth 
fraction. The bankruptcy fraction is affected by the average time of a business can survive 
and influenced by the adequacy of the market, where the longer the average length to 
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ratio of the number of companies in the market with market carrying capacity, so the 
growing number of companies will make the market adequacy is smaller. These causal 
relationships will form another balancing loop (B2). 
With above dynamic hypotheses the model structure is built to perform 
simulation. Data generated from the simulation are expected to follow the trend of data 
shown in Table II.1 and Figure II.2. Data generated from the simulation will then be tested 
statistically to see the differences in variation and the means level. 
 
FORMULATION OF MODELS AND SIMULATIONS 
 
 
The main purpose of this simulation is to generate data which can replicate the 
behavior of reference data. Some assumptions and initial conditions are applied in 
simulation, as follows; 
1. Companies produce normal goods with the same average cost and homogenous 
number of product. 
2. The company is not easy to adjust the level of production, so the new entrant can 
easily enter the market 
3. The Companies does not compete on price level and no cooperation between them. 
   
As for the initial conditions, each business category has some exogenous variables. Such 
variables can be seen in Table II.2: 
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Table II.2: Initial Condition 
 
Enterprise 
Category 
Number+ 
(Unit) 
Normal Survival++ 
(Year) 
Normal Growth Ratio* 
(%/Year) 
Crowding Out Ratio** 
(%/Year) 
 Stock Constant Constant Constant 
Small 774.912 3 38 80 
Medium 52.214 4 30 50 
Large 1.885 4 40 15 
Note:  + actual data 
* based on optimistic estimate of the average growth from the year 2005-2007 
+ / ** assumption 
 
   In this study, the crowding out ratio** is introduced. This ratio is exogenous and 
aims to reflect the company’s advantage for having access to the strategic resources such 
as business networks, strong stakeholders, banking trust, and other business experience to 
face a critical time such as economics crisis. The higher this ratio, the greater the likelihood 
a company will go out from the market when the competition is tightening. For some other 
exogenous variables can be seen in Table II.3 below: 
 
Table II.3: Exogenous variables 
 
Variable Normal New Demand Ratio* 
Demand 
Fulfillment Ratio* 
Normal 
Demand+ 
Average 
Production* 
Potential 
Demand* 
Dimension %/Year %/Year Goods/Year Goods/Unit/Year Goods/Year 
Definition Constant Constant Constant Constant Stock 
Value 80 78 82.901.100 100 120.000.000 
  Note:  * approximations  
+ product of firms’ average production and total quantity of firms 
 
   At the beginning of the simulation, market is considered in a state of 
equilibrium. In the equilibrium state, carrying capacity is equal to the total number of 
SMEs and LEs, thus the market adequacy ratio is equal to one.  The market carrying 
capacity is defined as how many firm units that market can support and calculated from the 
demand fulfillment rate divided by the normal demand and the firms’ average production 
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rate in the industry. Market capacity will change along with the changes in the ratio of 
demand fulfillment rate against its normal; the greater the ratio will give an indication of 
demand and market capacity increment to all business units.  Usually, LEs respond more 
quickly on information about market capacity increment than SMEs. 
At equilibrium state, where the demand is not changed yet, the market capacity 
equal to the total of SMEs and LEs therefore market adequacy ratio is one. It does not 
mean that the quantity of SMEs and LEs is not growing. Each period of time there will 
always be a net flow in a number of companies today (Van Praag, CM, Van Ophem; 
1995). By using initial condition assumption in Table II.2, the survival and normal growth 
rate will make the effective growth percentage of small, medium, and large business scale 
in every year sequentially are 4.67%, 5%, and 15% . Those percentages were reasonable 
since there are always entrepreneurs who will go out from the market due to retirement and 
on the other hand there are always new entrepreneurs who want to try their luck by 
establishing a new business. 
In general, there are several factors that have influence to the growth of firms 
quantity in industry, one of those factors is business cycle (Caree, 1999). During periods of 
a temporarily higher growth rate of new demand, entrants are attracted by profitability 
increase due to the inability of incumbents to expand their capacity fast enough (Hause and 
Du Rietz, 1984).  Considering such cycle, initial condition for the normal fraction of new 
demand is 80% from actual demand and the normal fraction of demand fulfillment is 78% 
thus the net demand growth rate is 2% per year.  The business cycle will make market 
carrying capacity and the firms’ quantity moves up and down all the time as shown in 
Figure II.4 below. 
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Figure II.4: Business Cycle’s effect on Market Carrying Capacity 
 
  
 
On the Figure II.4, it can be seen that by using initial condition data, simulation 
produces behaviors that reflect business cycle on the number of companies for all three 
categories and market carrying capacity as well. During the simulation period, the market 
carrying capacity behaves dynamically and has a different effect on the SMEs’ and LEs’ 
quantity. It also indicates that the smaller the business scale category, the stronger impact 
from a change in market carrying capacity. Meanwhile, LEs seem to experience a little 
disruption during the reduction market capacity and still record growth. 
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Figure II.5:  Comparison reference and simulated data from 1999 to 2003 
 
 
   
Figure II.5 constitutes a comparison between Figure II.1 and Figure II.4 that 
shows in the early period (from 1999 to 2003 for SMEs and from 1999 to 2004 for LEs), 
data generated by the simulation model is quite representative to follow the reference data 
behavior. Statistically, with the alpha of 5%, the difference in variation between reference 
data and simulated data can be said ‘not significant’. See Table II.4 below: 
Table II.4: Result of F-Stat test for observation period of 1999 to 2003 (for LEs: 2004) 
 
  Obs. df F P(F<=f) one-tail F Critical one-tail 
Small Enterprise 5 4 0.968459537 0.487983841 0.156537812 
Medium Enterprise 5 4 1.971633576 0.263511868 6.388232909 
Large Enterprise 6 5 3.144534595 0.117140509 5.050329058 
 
   
On the Table II.4 above, it appears that the probability to accept Null Hypothesis 
(Ho) are greater than the alpha value (0.05), so the rejection Ho unacceptable. This means 
that the variation between reference data and simulated are no different. For SMEs, 
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observation is made during the 5 years from 1999 to 2003, while for LEs, for 6 years from 
1999 to 2004. 
With the same observation with Table II.4 above, we also conducted statistical 
tests on the level of the average level of Alpha 5%, with the null hypothesis that the 
difference in means of the reference and simulated data are equal, where the results can be 
seen in Table II.5 below: 
Table II.5: Result of T-Test with Equal Variance Assumption 
 
  
Obs. Pooled Variance df t Stat 
P(T<=t) 
one-tail 
t Critical 
one-tail 
P(T<=t) 
two-tail 
t Critical 
two-tail 
Small 
Enterprise 5 1477529243 8 -0.791 0.226 1.860 0.452 2.306 
Medium 
Enterprise 5 11022108.56 8 -0.421 0.342 1.860 0.685 2.306 
Large 
Enterprise 6 489127.6403 10 -0.677 0.257 1.812 0.514 2.228 
 
On the Table II.5, it appears that the probability to accept Ho exceeds the alpha 
value (0.05) thus Ho cannot be rejected. In other words, means of reference data and 
simulated data are not different. With the test results shown in Table II.4 and II.5, can also 
be concluded that in the period prior to the shock emerged, models built with dynamic 
hypothesis (see Figure II.3) is quite representative.  
Furthermore, based on the mentioned conclusion so far, the model will be tested 
further with a longer observation from 1999 to 2009. By the longer observation period, the 
model structures on this study accommodates overshoot and collapse behavior from the 
reference data. Such behavior indicates that there must be policies or events that caused 
such effect on the reference data. 
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CASH AND IN-KIND TRANSFER POLICIES 
 
In general, efforts have been done by the Indonesian government to provide 
positive policies to the economy, especially policies for supporting the development of 
SMEs including micro enterprises and LEs as well. These policies can be grouped into two 
categories; direct or indirect. Direct policies for SMEs are grants, credit schemes, 
assistances, taxes exemption, and free fees for a new establishment. Indirect policies for 
SMEs are the law enactment to support greater loans and to improve credit guarantee 
system. These kinds of policies are applied during the initial period of observation from 
1999 to 2003. Nevertheless, those applied policies have no shock effect to the quantity of 
SMEs and LEs (see the trend on Figure II.1 from 1999 to 2003).  
On the other case, because of the shock on the quantity of all business units 
category starts from 2003, there must be some caused to make that shock.  Actually, there 
were some social and political policies applied starting 2003 in Indonesia.  
One of those applied policies was cash transfers policy which is called ‘Bantuan 
Langsung Tunai (BLT)’ or direct cash aid program. Implementation of the policy was 
started by the enactment of Presidential Instruction No. 12/2005 (BN. 7277 p. 10B) about 
the Implementation of BLT Program for Poor Households, on September 10, 
2005. Through this program that became known as "Santunan Langsung Tunai (SLT) ", the 
government provides grants for an estimated 15.5 million poor households. The amount of 
funds is Rp.100.000, - per family per month and given every three months. The distribution 
of the first phase is realized since October 1, 2005. The government provides funds for 
almost Rp 4, 6 trillion in total for the program.  
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The cash transfer policy was continued in 2008 with the issuance of Presidential 
Instruction No. 3 /2008 about the Implementation of Direct Cash Aid Program for Targeted 
Household, on May 14, 2008.  The government allocated funds of Rp 14.1 trillion on this 
program. This program is implemented for seven months from June to December 2008 
with a target of 91.1 million households. 
This policy is still continued in 2009 for the whole year. The program started by 
the enactment of Presidential Instruction No. 1 / 2009 on February 9, 2009. The 
presidential instruction is about the Implementation Cash Aid Program to Targeted 
Households for Poverty Reduction. Then, in 2010, the President did not issue similar 
instructions and automatically this program is stopped. 
Prior to the cash transfer policies implementation, there was another transfer 
mechanism thru political affair which was the general election and the possibility of money 
politics that happened before (2003) and during this democracy process (2004). National 
and local government allocated some amount of their budget for the general election’s 
logistic and political party contestant. Politicians try to provide in-kind assistance to 
prospective voters in order to ensure or increase the probability to be elected (Tabor, 
2002). This sympathetic assistance is another form of in-kind transfer which is done not 
directly by government but incumbent or new politicians. Officially the 2004 general 
elections spent around Rp 4.45 trillion plus USD 32.367 million. Then it was followed by 
the implementation of the cash transfers policy from 2005 to 2008 as mentioned above. 
According to Cunha, the policy cash or in-kind transfers such as the government 
implemented program or politician in-kind transfer as previously mentioned, will raise the 
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total demand for normal goods (Cunha et all, 2010). In line with his opinion, the dynamics 
hypotheses in Figure II.3 shown that the change in demand is influenced by those 
mentioned policies. 
Cash and in-kind transfer can be regarded as "faucet" that open and drain the 
potential demand into actual demand. This study supposed that the cash and in-kind 
transfers occurred from 2003 to 2008 were able to create a potential demand of 120 million 
goods per year. Continuously, the potential demand will be adopted to be the actual 
demand by these two mechanisms. The adoption of the potential demand is shown in 
Figure II.6 below. 
Figure II.6: Adoption of Potential Demand 
 
   In Figure II.6, can be seen that adoption of potential demand to be the actual 
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potential demand adopted would make the actual demand higher. The greater the actual 
demand satisfied the greater the market carrying capacity will be. 
After the simulation is done with cash and in-kind transfer policies from 2003, the 
results can be seen in Figure II.7 below.  
Figure II.7: Comparison between reference and simulated data from 1999 to 
2008 
    
On above figure can be seen that market capacity has increased significantly in 
2003 and then followed by drastic decline until 2008. However, the trend of simulated 
SMEs and LEs numbers, intuitively, can follow the reference data. Statistically, with the 
level of alpha is 5%, the difference in the variation of the reference and simulation data 
shows no significant difference. The test’s results of the F-test can be seen in Table II.6: 
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Table II.6: F-Test for observation from 1999 to 2008 
 
  Obs. df F P(F<=f) one-tail F Critical one-tail 
Small Enterprise 10 9 0.8099 0.3793 0.3146 
Medium Enterprise 10 9 1.3461 0.3325 3.1789 
Large Enterprise 10 9 0.9714 0.4831 0.3146 
 
   In Table II.6, the probability to reject Ho fall on acceptance region for small, 
medium, and large enterprise respectively 37,93%, 33, 25% and 48.31%. With these test 
results, conclusion can be established that the variations between reference data and 
simulated data are not different statistically. 
Based on the F test results in Table II.6, then homoscedastic T test is conducted to 
see the difference in means. The null hypothesis is the average of the two data is not 
different. The test results can be seen in Table II.7 below. 
Table II.7: Homoscedastic T-test for observation 1999 to 2008 
 
  
Obs. Pooled Variance df t Stat 
P(T<=t) 
one-tail 
t Critical 
one-tail 
P(T<=t) 
two-tail 
t Critical 
two-tail 
Small Enterprise 10 1.722E+11 18 -1.1411 0.1344 1.7341 0.2688 2.1009 
Medium Enterprise 10 5.103E+08 18 -0.4350 0.3344 1.7341 0.6687 2.1009 
Large Enterprise 10 2.852E+06 18 -0.9149 0.1862 1.7341 0.3723 2.1009 
 
In Table II.7, the probability of the test statistic is not fall into rejection area of the 
null hypothesis (Ho). Respectively for small, medium and large respectively are 26.88%, 
66.87% and 37.23%. Therefore, it can be concluded that on the means level there is no 
difference between reference data and data simulation. 
TREND PROJECTION OF SMES 
 
Based on empirical data trend, the impact cash and in-kind transfer on SMEs is 
that in the short term are able to attract new entrepreneurs to establish new businesses, 
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making the total number rise significantly. But in a longer period would result in a lower 
number SMEs than its original point. The number of small and medium enterprises at the 
beginning of the observation period (1999) was 774,912 units and 52,214 units become 
520,221 units and 39,657 units in 2008. Meanwhile, the projection number of SMEs up to 
2014 can be seen on Figure II.8. 
Figure II.8: Simulation result of SMEs’ number until 2014 
 
 
The simulation result can be seen on the Figure II.8 from where conclusion briefly 
can be drawn in to three projections. First projection is pessimistic one where it shows the 
declining decreasingly pattern up to 2014. Moderate projection is drawn from a linier 
growth trend where the number of small and medium enterprises will have a growth rate 
each 4.3% and 3.6% per year. On the other case, optimistic projection which is drawn from 
the mirror effect of pessimistic projection shows that the number of SMEs will soon 
bounce back with an increase decreasingly trend.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Several years from 1999 to 2008, the numbers of businesses in the category of 
small and medium enterprises were growing with a dynamics trend. From 1999 to 2003, 
the numbers were growing with a linier trend and a minor oscillation following the pattern 
of business cycle. In this period the government implemented some social, economics, and 
political policies, but did not make any shock effect on the number of small, medium, and 
large. Nevertheless in period of 2003 to 2008, the data of business unit number for small, 
medium, and large category indicate a shock effect.  
In general, hypotheses of this paper are built based on backwards thinking which 
are that the number of business depends on the market carrying capacity and market 
carrying capacity is influenced by the number of demand. Thus the shock on the data is 
caused by the significant increase then sharp decline on the demand. 
Entrepreneurs’ decision to establish a new business or to enter the market is based 
on their observation and perception on demand level through industry selling rate data 
(demand fulfillment rate) in a period of time. The higher selling rate will be perceived as 
increasing demand in the market. This perception will lead to new business establishment 
or attract new entrant in to the market. The decision to enter will affect the equilibrium of 
market carrying capacity. Increasing demand in the mid period of observation is caused by 
adoption process of potential demand into actual demand. Adoption process is occurred 
due to the cash and in-kind transfer policies either for social or political purposes. 
Cash and in-kind transfer policies implementation in Indonesia have indeed an 
impact indirectly on the number of SMEs and even LEs. In general, the pessimistic and 
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moderate projections imply that the implementation cash and in-kind transfer policies have 
a negative impact for SMEs in the long term, which is the lowering effect is much greater 
than the increasing effect. As for LEs, the policies have different effects which is in the 
short term also able to increase the number, meanwhile in the longer time is declining, 
although the total number is not lower than the number on the initial observation.   
Precaution should be put on the pessimistic and moderate projections where the 
negative effect of the policies can be exposed. The model simulation on this paper urged 
that without immediate proper policy to tackle the damaging effect of those policies on 
SMEs, the quantity of SMEs will very hard to reach the same point as 1999, even though in 
the far forthcoming year, beyond 2014.  
However, this study still used some variables which are assumed exogenous, such 
as the crowding out ratio and some other variables. For further research, it would be more 
interesting if the exogenous variables are drawn to be endogenous variables. In addition, 
further research should include a model policy that could prevent the damaging effect of 
cash or in-kind transfer policies to SMEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Barlas, Yaman 2004, System Dynamics: Systemic Feedback Modeling For Policy Analysis, 
in Encyclopedia Of Technology, Information, and Systems Management 
Resources, in Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under 
the Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publishers, Oxford ,UK, http://www.eolss.net 
Berry, Albert; Edgard Rodriguez; Henry Sandee (2002), Firm and group dynamics in the 
small and medium enterprise sector in Indonesia, Small Business Economics; Feb-
May 2002; 18, 1-3; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 141 
Breierova, Lucia (1997), Generic Structures: Overshoot and Collapse, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
Caree, MA and A.R Thurik (1999). The carrying capacity and entry and exit flows in 
retailing. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17 (1999) 985–1007. 
Cunha, Jesse M., Giacomo De Giorgi., Seema Jayachandran (2010), The Price Effects of 
Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers, CEPR Development Economics Conference, 
Barcelona. 
Hause, J.C., Du Rietz, G (1984). Entry, industry growth, and the micro-dynamics of 
industry supply.Journal of Political Economy 92, 733–757. 
Instruksi Presiden No. 12/2005 (BN. 7277hal. 10B) tentang Pelaksanaan Bantuan 
Langsung Tunai Kepada Rumah Tangga Miskin tanggal 10 September 2005 
Instruksi Presiden No 3 Tahun 2008 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Langsung 
Tunai Untuk Rumah Tangga Sasaran tanggal 14 Mei 2008 
  
31 
 
Intruksi Presiden No 1 Tahun 2009 tentang Pelaksanaan Program Bantuan Untuk Rumah 
Tangga Sasaran Dalam Rangka Penanggulangan Kemiskinan tanggal 9 Februari 
2009 
Sterman, John D (2000)., Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a 
Complex World., MIT Sloan School of Management 
Tabor, Steven R (2002), Assisting the Poor with Cash: Design and Implementation of 
Social Transfer Programs, World Bank Institute, September 2002. 
Tambunnan, T (2007) "   Trade and investment liberalization effects on SME development:                      
A literature review and a case study of Indonesia", pp.117-162, Chapter V in 
ESCAP, Towards coherent policy frameworks: understanding trade and investment 
linkages – A study by the Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, 
(United Nations, New York). 
Van Praag, C.M., Van Ophem, H (1995). Determinants of willingness and opportunity to 
start as an entrepreneur. Kyklos 48, 513–540. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
32 
 
CHAPTER III 
USING SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH TO SUPPORT 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH NUMBER OF SMALL AND MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISES IN INDONESIA: SOME POLICIES 
CONSIDERATION2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The current data from the Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia (BPS) 
regarding the number of small, medium enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises 
(LEs) in Indonesia from year 1999 until 2008 indeed demonstrated a dynamic 
behavior.  Thus, the paper has objectives to discuss and propose policies such as; first, 
from operational side: providing market information in order to give more access for 
market demand, market capacity. This strategy will in the long term lead to a better 
production planning. Second, from the financing side: using profit-sharing principle of 
financing (PSP) to cope with such dynamics behavior in order to support a sustainable 
quantity growth of SMEs.  
System dynamics approach is applied to understand this behavior. Some relevant 
variables included in the simulation model are potential demand, aggregate demand, and 
quantity of SMEs and LEs. Modular system of simple production coordination and a 
guarantee mechanism based on a PSP were attached to the generic system that has 
generated overshoot and collapse behavior, in order to minimize or even avoids the rapid 
decreasing number of SMEs in stock.  
Simulation conducted in this paper has implemented two policy levers, which are 
first; a production coordination system through information sharing and second; financing 
mechanism with PSP contract for Small Enterprises (SEs). Based on the simulation done 
for this paper, such policy levers could support the development of SMEs in term of its 
quantity in order to keep it grow instead of “collapse.” The paper also shows the added 
value creation of PSP principle in economy and minimization of the agency risk with 
double layers referencing method.  
This paper re-emphasizes first; the use of production coordination to support 
positive growth number of SMEs especially to prevent collapse after experiencing 
overshoot growth, and second;  proposes a financing mechanism for SMEs based on PSP 
principle to prevent SMEs from the operational failure. This paper also proposes the use of 
double layer referencing system to minimize agency risk in the area of PSP contract 
agreement. 
 
Key words: Small Medium Enterprise, Production Coordination, Profit Sharing, 
System Dynamics 
 
                                                          
2
 The first version of the paper has been presented at  II Conference of WCSA-World Complexity Science 
Academy, September 26th – 27th, 2011, Palermo, Italy 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have very important roles in economic 
development. Some of these roles are as the significant contributor to the gross domestic 
production (GDP) and employment creator. According to The Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS), Indonesia's reports, as of 2007, SMEs (including micro enterprises) contributed 
53.49% to GDP and employed 85.4 million people (96.2% of total employment). In the 
year of 2008, SMEs including micro enterprise contributed 56.23% to the GDP meanwhile 
large enterprises (LES) contributed 43.77%. And for 2009, Indonesia's GDP reaches 
4,696.48 trillion rupiah (Rp) in which SMEs contributed 55.56%. However, the quantity of 
net growth percentage of SMEs’ number in Indonesia only reached an average of 5.76% 
per annum for the category of small businesses and 3% for medium-sized enterprises from 
1999 to 2008.  
 The successful development of SMEs in Indonesia is still based on the net growth 
rate of SMEs number per annum, although some researchers urge to change the old 
paradigm into the new one. In conclusion, of his writings, Tambunan (2008) suggested to 
change the old paradigm which is the successful SMEs development strategy is marked by 
the annual increase in the number of units, and SMEs are important because they create 
employment into a new paradigm; the successful SMEs development strategy is marked by 
the annual increase in the number of innovated and productive enterprises, and SMEs are 
important because they generate high added value, export, and they support domestic 
industry's competitiveness. However, the offered new paradigm does not yet provide a 
clear-cut measurement to determine innovativeness, productiveness, high value added, and 
competitiveness thus can be said normative.  
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Therefore, the paper examines the development trend of SMEs’ number pursuant 
to policies that directly or indirectly have an influence on such development. According to 
Subroto, in the research he has done, mentioning that the development of SMEs in 
Indonesia is even influenced by policies that are not addressed to SMEs directly. This 
conclusion he took after the identification of policy and empirical observation of data 
trends the number of SMEs in Indonesia from 1999 to 2003 and 2003 to 2008. In the 
period of 1999 to 2003, some policies were intended for SMEs directly but seemed unable 
to raise a significant amount of net growth, which on average only grows about 3,29% per 
year. Whereas in the period 2003 to 2008 mentioned there are several policies related to 
social policies that have been applied by governments and politicians are even able to 
increase the number of SMEs, although in the long run to clue the impact of a drastic 
reduction. The data shows that in 2008, the number of SMEs less than the amount in 1999 
(Subroto, 2011).   
 This paper further aims to provide an overview that can be drawn from current 
data on SMEs in Indonesia and then to identify variables in the policy system's boundary 
which have a direct or indirect connection with the development of SMEs. The process of 
the identification system and the variable is done by using a causal effect relationship in a 
form of stock and flow diagrams (SFD). Further simulation with several initial assumptions 
in order to generate data whose behavior can mimic its historical or reference data. Finally, 
to simulate and discuss some policy recommendations that could be taken as a system 
intervention so that the system structure could generate the desired behavior of the data.    
This paper will be presented in several sections. The discussion will be 
emphasized to the application of the methodology rather than to discuss the methodology 
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of system dynamics per se. In the first part will discuss the data and previous research that 
are well aligned with this study. The results of previous studies will also be revealed to 
provide a preliminary description that motivates this research to find alternative sustainable 
policy solutions.   
Next section will briefly discuss the scope and limits of markets reached by SMEs 
because of its association with the effectiveness of policies implemented. In the following 
section will discuss the structure of stock and flow diagrams (SFD) by which can produce 
simulated data that is intended to mimic the behavior of the reference data. Some of the 
policy will be plugged on the generic model in an attempt to intervene on the structure to 
control the behavior of the generated data by a structure as what is the modeler desired, 
which is developing SMEs in a sustainable way.   
DATA AND PREVIOUS RESEARCHES 
 
In the recent data published by BPS can be seen on its trend on the number of 
SMEs in Indonesia from 1999 to 2008 has a dynamic pattern with a sharp rise then 
followed by a sharp decline right after that. There is a net growth trend in the number of 
SMEs from 1999 to 2003, although the magnitude is less satisfactory with an average net 
growth of 3.29%. However, further data on how much this growth rate increase is not 
known precisely neither the decline. Whereas in the period of 2003 to 2008 seems the trend 
is very volatile, where the number of SMEs experienced a large increase (42.81%) 
followed by a drastic decline (70.31%). The development of these trends can be seen in the 
following Figure III.1: 
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Figure III.1: Historical data behavior 
 
Source: Subroto (2011)  
 
Nevertheless, government institutions have done some activities in favor of SMEs 
that were applied during the year of 1997 until 2003. Those policies are as much as 531 
activities such as; capital assistance (5.3%), training (21.1%), facilitation (11.3%), 
information (1.9%), facilities (16.2%), promotion (3.0%), dissemination/introduction of 
new technology (27.9%), guideline (4%) and others (9%) (SMERU, 2004). The historical 
data behavior on the Figure III.1 implies that those activities have less impact to develop 
SMEs sustainable. In other words, there must be something else in the system i.e. 
endogenous variables are omitted or treated as exogenous variables.   
Associated with behavioral of the mentioned historical data, Subroto revealed that 
along the period of the dynamic behavior of the data, the government has implemented 
several policies related to social policy and economic stimuli such as Unconditional Cash 
Transfer (UCT) or in Indonesian terms is called “Bantuan Langsung Tunai” (BLT). In 
conclusion, of his research, he urged that the UCT in the short term will be able to increase 
the demand for normal goods and will then trigger an increase in the number of SME. 
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However, in the long run the policy would have a deadly impact for the SME itself 
(Subroto, 2011).  
BOUNDARY POLICY: DOMESTIC MARKET AND SMES PROBLEM 
 
Then a further question is whether it really was national policies or there are also 
significant external factors from abroad affecting the development of SMEs. To answer 
that question then we can see the comparison between the results of SMEs that exported 
and sold domestically.  
Market targeted by the SMEs sector seems a national market. This insight is 
coming from the comparison data development between the value of domestic products 
and export value of SMEs. It appears that the products produced by SMEs only a small 
portion is exported. From 2004 to 2008, SMEs exported an average of only 7.12% of its 
GDP. Herewith, it can be said that the market of SMEs is the domestic market that is 
around 92.88%. More detail on export of SMEs product can be seen in Table III.1 below:  
Table III.1. Exported SMEs product 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDP (billion rupiah) 1,271,990.10  1,491,061.90  1,786,218.30  2,105,135.10   2,609,360.10  
EXPORT (million rupiah)      95,548.24  110,338.07  122,310.86  143,012.33  183,759.08  
Export percentage 7.51% 7.40% 6.85% 6.79% 7.04% 
Source: BPS 
 
With those facts, the policies that directly or indirectly aimed for the public to 
cope with social and economic problem that have a national coverage greatly will influence 
the development of businesses in terms of its number, for the category of micro, small and 
medium. While, on the other hand, the problems often faced by SMEs to date is difficult to 
know, but in general can be used the survey conducted by BPS in 2003 as the proxy. 
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Problems are faced by SMEs in Indonesia according to BPS’ survey in manufacturing 
industry can be seen on the Table III.2 below:  
Table III.2. Main Problem of SMEs in the Manufacturing Industry 
 
 Small Enterprise (%) Micro Enterprise (%) 
Have no problem 19.48 25.21 
Have problems of: 80.52 74.79 
1.Raw Material  10.60 21.53 
2. Marketing 40.18 29.65 
3. Capital 39.96 34.56 
4.Tansportation/Distribution 2.62 2.68 
5. Energy 2.4 2.73 
6. Labor cost 1.22 0.77 
7. Others  6.04 8.09 
Total (Unit) 238.582 2.490.118 
Source: BPS 2003 cited from Tambunan (2008a) 
 
Although it is well known to the literature that the lack of adequate skills is also a 
major constraint to SMEs, especially SEs and MIEs, in Indonesia, they did not consider it 
as a serious problem. However, this may be since  many owners of SEs and MIEs were not 
aware that their productivity is low and the quality of their products inferior compared to 
the products of the LEs or imported products, especially since many of these enterprises 
produce only for low-income consumers in local markets  that  enjoy  natural  protection  
from  competition  from  similar  goods  produced  by  larger  enterprises or from import 
(Tambunan, 2008a). Still on the Table III.2 above, it appears that capital is the major 
constraint for SMEs, almost 40% for small firms and 34.56% for micro enterprises. Then 
the other main problem is marketing. This problem may arise because the products of the 
SMEs did not meet the quality standards of the market expected, as has been disclosed by 
Tambunan in his research.   
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GENERIC SYSTEM: OVERSHOOT AND COLLAPSE 
 
In the system dynamic literatures, the behavior patterns of the historical data of 
the number of SMEs in Indonesia are shown in Figure III.1 p.36 is said to follow the 
generic behavior namely overshoot and collapse (Barlas, 2004; Breierova, 1997; Sterman, 
2000). Such pattern of behavior can occur because the system received a "shock," in this 
case the shock is occurred in the aggregate ‘SMEs produced goods demand’—goods 
produced by SMEs in this paper are assumed as normal goods. Such behavior can be 
generated by simulating the structure of the system depicted in the stock and flow diagram 
in Figure III.2 below: 
Figure III.2. Stock and Flow Diagram (SFD) Overshoot and Collapse Structure 
 
 Source: cited from Subroto, 2011. 
Figure III.2 above shows that aggregate demand is influenced by the growth 
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reduced when the market has been fulfilled by the growth of demand fulfillment rate. The 
magnitude of demand fulfillment rate is influenced by several variables such as total SMEs 
production of goods, total number of SMEs, and the actual aggregate demand itself. The 
more all the three variables increase will make the demand fulfillment is higher and the 
more demand fulfillment, the lesser aggregate demand (B3).   
 In another case, the number of SMEs is influenced by the amount of new 
businesses are subscribed, where its magnitude is influenced by market adequacy. The 
higher level of market adequacy will stimulate people to establish a new venture, but with 
the increasing number of new venture will further reduce market adequacy (B1). On the 
other hand, the numbers of existing SMEs and their production have a positive influence 
on the level demand fulfillment, where the higher number of SMEs and their production 
will create a higher level demand fulfillment. The generated data behavior from the generic 
model simulation included “shock” variable could more or less replicate the historical data. 
The small and medium generated data behavior can be seen in Figure III.3a and III.3b.  
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Figure III.3a: Small Enterprise Behavior   Figure III.3b: Medium Enterprises 
Behavior 
  
 Source: Cited from Subroto, 2011 
 
As it can be seen also on above two figures that those behaviors could not be said 
sustainable3 as the amount of SMEs were not growing endurably over the time. In the next 
section will be introduced some approaches or policies by which are intended to cope with 
the current non-sustainable trend of SMEs.  
POLICY LEVER OPTIONS 
 
To develop sustainable SMEs it would require efforts to synergize policies on the 
micro and macro aspect. Such synergy of the policy is pursued in order to make SMEs 
more efficient in implementing-supply chain management. In that regard, the policy 
makers must consider the grouping of SMEs based on its common business operations in 
an area, access to efficient and inexpensive raw materials as well as the information 
provision on the market demand. This section will discuss deeper about two options of 
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policy, first; policy on production coordination as a macro approach. It is already widely 
known that the stock management is a very important activity in business. In national level, 
when entrepreneurs are able to manage their stock efficiently, in the long run, it will make 
the industry more efficient and companies more resilient to cope with crisis situations. Of 
course, stock management will be more efficient when in a group which has a 
commonality. Another advantage could be gained by the entrepreneur while adopting the 
stock management, especially in Indonesia is obtain additional capital for production and 
business development since the Indonesian government has enacted a ministerial decree on 
the warehouse receipt to support such effort (Kep. Men No: 13.1/Per/M.KUKM/VII/2006).  
The second policy lever is about the use of profit sharing principle (PSP) 
financing for small enterprises (SEs) as a more micro approach. This second policy will 
discuss about the value creation process in PSP financing in the economy could give 
positive value added that able to outperform expected future value of capital invested based 
on the risk-free rate discount. The discussion also addresses the use of double layers 
referencing system as an effort to minimize agency risk.  
MACRO APPROACH: PRODUCTION COORDINATION 
 
This macro approach means the provision of soft-infrastructure by coordinating 
the efforts of production within a national scope. The selection of this approach generally 
follows the idea of Mezgar, Mezgar and Kovacs about SMEs network co-ordination in 
production. According to them, this co-ordination is very promising, because it offers the 
advantages of the holonic manufacturing paradigm giving the possibility, in parallel, of 
keeping the traditional individualism of SMEs (Mezgar and Kovacs (1998); Mezgar et al 
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(2000)). The approach proposed involves the role of market demand information, 
production planning, and production contracts. Within this paper, such the idea is adopted 
by a general angle point of view which appears in Figure III.4 below.  
Figure III.4: Stock and Flow Diagram of Production Co-Ordination 
 
Significant step in coordinating the production needs to be taken without violating 
the principle of free competition, such as; first, by providing credible information about the 
current of market demand and the conditional optimal safety stock for entrepreneurs. The 
logics of this step are as follows: where if a business has never had expectations of sales 
than of course it is difficult to set safety stock and lead to fail to perform production 
planning. In the absence of production planning, then the amount of goods produced may 
not meet the market demand which means loss of sales opportunities or leads to excess 
storage costs. In the fast-changing business environment such as the market demand 
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condition, any fail to have good information on the market demand to create the 
expectation will lead to the greater loss.  
The second step is to strengthen institutions that have been available, which can 
be utilized by small and medium companies to coordinate production independently and in 
groups, i.e., cooperative or business group.  Market conditions, i.e. demand; are always 
changing and of course, it has negative impacts, but these negative impacts can be 
minimized if the business activities carried out in groups, i.e. clusters, the formation of a 
larger effort of a combination of small businesses in the form of equity partnership or joint 
production, i.e. plasma system.  
 In Figure III.4 above, in general point of view, series of causal effect relationship 
of the relevant variables in a production coordination system has been included. The 
system begins with the provision of information about aggregate demand; availability of 
the information will form expectations of aggregate demand. The greater the expectations 
will make the greater aggregate production. Similarly, the effect of safety stock 
management also makes the aggregate production increase. With the increment in 
aggregate production then automatically the average production will also rise. The rise of 
the average production level effects on the level of demand fulfillment rate so that 
aggregate demand will also be reduced (B3), then at the same time the higher level of 
average production will lead to the market carrying capacity reduction (R3).  
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MICRO APPROACH: PROFIT SHARING PRINCIPLES (PSP) FINANCING 
SYSTEM 
 
Another policy option proposed in this thesis is to use an approach which has 
more micro point of views through a financing system that does not emphasize merely on 
the business collateral, but gives more emphasis on the business activity and process. The 
financing concept with strong emphasis on business activities is offered by financing 
system based on the principle of mudarabah or profit sharing principle (here and after will 
be written as PSP). This choice is based on the opinion of Iqbal and Mirakhor, they stated 
that the concept of the PSP especially for small and medium size enterprises can play a 
critical role and become the backbone of the financial landscape of a developing economy 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). In this regard, Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance 
(IIBI) has the same tone in supporting the use of PSP to support SMEs as it says that the 
small and medium enterprises (SME) sector has a great potential for expanding production 
capacity and self-employment opportunities in developing countries. Islamic banks may 
introduce SME-financing funds for various places. Enhancing the role of the financial 
sector in the development of the SME sub-sector can mitigate the serious problems of 
unemployment and the low level of exports of such countries (IIBI, 2011). 
In addition for another encouraging consideration for the capital owner to follow 
the use of the PSP system for SEs is the opportunity to reach new available market in 
financing area. According to the data from the BPS, small and medium enterprises, which 
are fully funded by another entity on average from 1998 to 2010 are 4.10% only, this can 
be seen as a great opportunity to support the larger SMEs to adopt the PSP financing 
system in Indonesia.   
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 Conceptually, this approach is preferred because of having more emphasis on 
business activity not merely on collateral to minimize risk as the conventional system. So 
far, experts in SMEs area have agreed on the main obstacle for SMEs to grow is the 
limitation to access the financial resource (i.e. Tambunan, 2008a), especially in Indonesia, 
as it can be seen on the Table III.2 in the previous section.  However, if this system is 
widely adopted, most of the problems faced by SMEs in the early stage of creating a new 
venture can be addressed.  Another problem often faced by small and medium enterprises 
is the risks of failure that are enormous. It is also stated by Timmons that the failure rate of 
small and medium enterprises is over 20% of new ventures to fail within one year while 
66% fail within six years (Timmons, 1994). Thus efforts to minimize the high failure rate 
require a different approach than usual, where the approach must be beneficial to both 
parties, give more emphasis on the assessment of its business activities and are able to 
eliminate the risk of loss that will be experienced by entrepreneurs, so entrepreneurs are 
more focused in the running business without a mental burden to pay back the interest.  
 Despite some positive reasons for the use of the PSP approach above, the 
application of this approach is not without challenges. Some pessimistic views are 
expressed by Visser and Choudury in their opinion. Visser said that SMEs are not served 
well by Islamic banks because of bookkeeping of SMEs in countries where Islamic banks 
operate is very elementary, often which works against the use of musharaka or profit loss 
sharing (here and after will be written as PLS) and PSP finance. Moreover, often small-
scale entrepreneurs are not too keen on the close monitoring implied by PLS partnerships 
anyway, and PLS finance again does not fill the need for fluctuating funds. (Visser, 2009).  
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Pessimistic tones also come from Choudhury, he suggests that PSP and PLS have 
inherent problems (especially when combined in joint venture financing instruments) 
because they do not attain the ideal of co-operative participation. They lack precision in 
capitalizing the value of time or wages that workers and other participants contribute in 
any joint venture with the capital providers. He argues that the profit sharing ratios remain 
poorly determined, and sets out a more exact representation of the intent of Islamic law in 
an Islamic joint venture enterprise (Choudhury, 2001). 
Dar and Presley have made a list related to the PSP’s weakness such as vulnerable 
to agency problems, the requirement of   well-defined  property  rights  to  function  
efficiently, product competitiveness, allows a sleeping partnership, less feasible for funding 
short-term projects, unfair treatment in taxation, and the non-existent of secondary  
markets  thus failed  to effectively mobilize financial resources (Dar and Presley, 2000).  
It  is  often  emphasized  that  agency problems  are  more  severe  in  Islamic  
banks  than  conventional  banks  and  non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Actually, 
the problems of identifying the good borrower (information asymmetry) and effectively 
monitoring (moral hazard) are  not  limited  to  Islamic  finance, i.e. PSP and PLS:  they  
are  challenges  in  almost  all financial  contracts, particularly  in  entrepreneurial  finance. 
Given the sensitivity of profit and loss sharing contracts to moral hazard and information 
asymmetry, Islamic finance, particularly profit and loss sharing contracts [PSP and PLS] 
contracts, have thus far failed to reach Micro and SMEs in a significant way (Gabal, 
Nirvana Abou, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Bailey Klinger (2001).  
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Modern finance literature provides some solutions. These include  monitoring  
and  bonding  arrangements  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976),  separation of management 
(initiation and implementation of decisions) and control (ratification and monitoring  of  
decisions)  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983),  and  staging  of  capital  provision (Sahlman, 
1990). Nonetheless, these  processes have some  consequences, which limit  the  
opportunity  for  an  agent  to mismanage  or  abuse  the  project,  while  at  the  same  time  
increasing  expenses  and reduces profit. 
There are others suggested remedy to cope with the agency problem in PSP 
contract agreement. Dar and Presley proposed the used of an organizational structure based 
on venture capital namely venture capital organization (VCO), in which a group of Islamic 
banks establishes a venture  capital  fund to  invest  in  troubled  companies  or  acquire  
public  corporations facing privatization. The operationalization of the VCO can be seen on 
the Figure III.5 below: 
Figure III.5: Venture Capital Organization Establishment 
 
 Source: Dar and Presley, 2000 
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They urged the VCO’s advantages such as provides a balance of power between 
management and other owners, better value creation, alignment  of  interests  between  
manager and shareholders thus mitigating  the  agency  problem. Information  sharing  will  
be  less  costly thus  quickening  the  pace  of  decision-making, and positive monitoring by 
the institutional investor thus  reducing agency costs (Dar and Presley, 2000). 
In order to tackle the problem of identifying good borrower (information 
asymmetry) and effectively monitoring (moral hazard), Gabal, Nirvana Abou, Asim Ijaz 
Khwaja, Bailey Klinger (2001) proposed the use of psychometric  tests  to  directly  
measure  a  potential borrower’s  entrepreneurial  ability to identify good business  and  
honesty to help  minimize  the  moral  hazard  problem  since  such entrepreneurs  are  
intrinsically  less  inclined  to  cheat/hide  profits  and  hence  are  more  likely  to  repay 
loans  and  require  less  monitoring. They have tested the use of the their proposed test 
with the results are  21-40%  reduction  in  default  and  a  15  to  50% increase in net 
profits on simulated implementations of the tool across pilot partners. 
The solutions that have been discussed above in many ways have shown efforts to 
minimize the risk of the agency problem that caused by asymmetric information that are in 
practice still facing practical difficulty. Practically, VCO will almost be sure need a longer 
time to implement since it requires some actors with difference morality, background, and 
perceptions thus need very strong regulations. Nonetheless, relationship among them will 
raise yet another complexity. Meanwhile, the used of psychometric test to measure ability 
and honesty can be said a plausible innovation of selection tools. However, tools like the 
other tools are just like a gun behind the man. Relationship among the man with the 
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culture, background, and perception will be able to ‘use’ or ‘cheat’ the tools. The 3D 
picture cannot be revealed by once a camera’s shoot.  
Those concerns above could be an obstacle in the effort to implement PSP in the 
real situation. Nevertheless, putting more emphasis on business activities is indeed 
something that is not easy, because it requires a high understanding and trust among the 
parties in a business agreement which is the funds owner (rabbul mal) and entrepreneur 
(mudarib). Reputation and personality of entrepreneurs are very significant for the funds 
owner to determine to whom they can invest their money. So, the question is about who 
knows and how to know the person’s reputation and personality?, one cannot be so sure the 
others’ reputation and personality in neither only by one shot of a test nor in a short period 
of observation, but it need a multiple shots and longer observation period. However, it is 
widely agreed that person’s reputation and good personality can be built. The former is 
through some experiences of skillful work, and the latter is through behavior in the 
community along the time. One thing that can be assured is a good and bad thing in the 
community is always become either a favorable or unfavorable word of mouth (WOM). 
Such information could be fundamentally important to determine person’s reputation and 
personality rating. 
In the effort to cope with the concern of minimizing the agency problems in the 
PSP contract, this paper introduces a double layer referencing system as can be seen on the 
Figure III.6. The important and fundamental role in the system is that the existence of 
independent communal institutions to record and to provide information on individual or 
group entrepreneur’s reputation and personality. The reputation and personality rating is 
not solely based on records of tangible capability such as feasibility of business plans but 
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also notes on aspects that are more personal and intangible, such as specific or high qualify 
skills, positive attitude references, etc. The qualifications of this individual or group should 
be conducted by independent professional appraiser organizations by involving variety 
sources of referrer, i.e. reference from persons have been appraised as having positive 
reputation and personality; this is the first layer of the referencing. Such agency should 
have a database of individuals or groups, which have a positive reputation and 
continuously maintained and updated. With such database, the funds owner could take an 
advantage to choose prospective entrepreneur and then arrange business agreements with 
those who are able to submit a viable business proposal.  
 The main features of the PSP covenant such as limited time contract, profit 
sharing percentage, any loss is born to the funds owner; are adopted in this paper with 
some necessary quantification, which is illustrated in Figure III.6 p. 53. The figure also 
depicted the important role of ‘reputation and personality rating’ agencies. The agencies 
shall continually develop a database of individuals or groups, which have a positive 
reputation and personality (PRP). This database can be accumulated; the accumulation is 
depended on the magnitude of the net addition where size of this database depends on the 
WOM effect from the people in the database either have a PSP contract or wait for a 
contract (R1, R4). Such WOM effect is called the first referencing system in this paper. 
However, the exponential growth of the database is slowly will reach the mature 
state where the available potential people with positive reputation and personality have 
been included in the database (B1) and akin of loop is applicable for the growth of new 
entrepreneur with a contract (B2). Nonetheless, the ended agreement will also mean a 
subtraction on the people with positive reputation and personality hold an agreement (B3). 
  
52 
 
On average, a fraction of person or groups in the database will sign PSP contract 
within a certain time, by holding the contract, entrepreneur has the capital to run their 
business without interference from the fund owner. The more persons with PRP in the 
database will lead to the more ‘new agreement’. The new agreement will be signed also 
based on the reference coming from ‘entrepreneur hold a contract’, who will make a 
positive review on the other person with PRP by his/her best knowledge for signing a new 
contract through an internship mechanism; this is what is called as the second layer 
referencing system (R9).  The number of new agreement is affected also by the perception 
of the funds owner on the actual to expected growth of capital invested ratio, specifically if 
the ratio is more than 1 (one) means an increment on the new agreement otherwise a 
decrement.  
The capital will be used to enlarge the capacity to generate assets anyway, such as 
fixed assets and current assets (inventory, etc.). Constantly, part of the assets, i.e. inventory 
will be liquidated through the sale and at the end of the period of the agreement all assets 
must be liquidated or valuated to determine the amount of profit or loss. Profit if any will 
be distributed strictly according to the agreement in the beginning of the covenant between 
funds owner and entrepreneur while a loss if any will be born to the funds owner. 
Distribution should be made based on a percent amount not a fixed amount.  The greater 
amount of profit share and capital liquidation per year will make the ratioof Actual to 
Expected Growth of Capital Invested (AEGCI) is higher and eventually will increase the 
amount of capital (R7) and increase the amount of retained earnings (R11).  
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Double Layer Referencing System 
 
Figure III. 6: Stock and Flow Diagram of Profit Sharing Principle (PSP) and Double 
Layer Referencing System 
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The higher ratio in another way will lead to the increment of the average 
reputation and personality on the entrepreneur through a positive nonlinear effect on its net 
change, which has been quantified as the following Figure III.7: 
Figure III.7: Quantification of Effect AEGCI ratio to ARP net change 
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On the other side, of course, the number of agreement could be used as an 
indication of good outlook on the economic growth at the same time will increase the 
capital invested in PSP contract and also increase the expected average growth of capital 
invested, but eventually these expectations will reduce the AEGCI ratio. These series of 
causality will create balancing loop (B11). The reinforcing for the ratio is coming from the 
accumulation on the agreement number; the higher the number in the system, the lesser 
expected value per agreement then eventually will reinforce the AEGCI ratio (R3). That is 
why in a year the AEGCI ratio will grow and then collapses as can be seen on the Figure 
III.8 below: 
Figure III.8: Behavior of AEGCI ratio in 1 (one) year simulation 
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thesis proposes the implementation of PSP contract system for SEs since it is suitable 
covered by private sector financing i.e. more or less for 50 million rupiah of capital. The 
new agreement of the PSP contract will make the Net SE subscribers increase along with 
the SEs subscribers without the PSP contract scheme, and finally will increase the number 
of SEs. 
 There can also be noticed a connection between Figure III.3 and Figure III.6. 
Both figures are connected by a variable namely Net SMEs Subscriber. However, since the 
PSP contract in the thesis is applied for the small enterprise, the variable name is modified 
to Net SE Subscriber.  
To develop sustainable SMEs, it is the necessary to make efforts to coordinate the 
policy at the macro level in terms of production coordination and at the micro level in 
terms of the PSP contract base financing i.e. mudarabah for small enterprises.  Such policy 
coordination is pursued in order to make SMEs more efficient in production and gain some 
positive impacts from the PSP financing system that is not only emphasize merely on the 
"bankable proposal" but give more emphasis on the "business activity skill," especially for 
small enterprises in order to boost the new small enterprises subscriptions rate.  
In that regard to ease production coordination, the policy makers must consider 
some effort such as the grouping of business activities in an area, access to raw materials in 
an efficient and inexpensive, the provision of market demand information. Combination of 
such two approaches will be able to drive to the sustainable development of SMEs, as it 
will be shown in the simulation result discussion in the next section.     
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SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
The paper’s simulation has been run based on the some initial conditions and 
assumptions that can be seen on Table III.3a below and III.3b p. 59. These tables give 
clues on the initial value used on the simulation and its final result. Expectations on some 
variables have been reached. 
Table III.3a: PSP contract simulation with the time step: 1 day and  
Simulation period: 4 years 
No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Cash Assets Stock 4 billion  Max 38,018,810,659,480 rupiah (rp) 
2 Non Cash Assets Stock 0 Max 67,243,809,736,741.98 rp 
3 Acquisition Time Constant 2 - - Month (mo) 
4 Normal Net Acquisition 
Margin 
Constant 7 - - % 
5 Normal Net Liquidation 
Margin 
Constant 7 - - % 
6 Average Reputation Stock .5 1 1 Dimentionle
ss (dmnl) 
7 Time to Review Reputation Constant 1 - - mo 
8 Maximum Reputation Constant 1 - - dmnl 
9 Potential Reputation Stock .5 0 0 dmnl 
10 Investor Profit Sharing 
Percentage 
Constant 50 - - % 
11 Paid Back Capital Stock .1 Max 48,436,690,570,044.01 rp 
12 Capital Stock 4 billion Max 38,018,810,659,480 rp 
13 Retained Earning Stock 0 Max 94,648,433,051,187,39 rp 
14 Total Assets (TA) Auxiliary 4 billion = TE =TE rp 
15 Total Equity (TE) Auxiliary 4 billion = TA =TA rp 
16 Number of Agreement Stock 80 maximum 760,376 Agreement 
(ag) 
17 Average Capital Invested per 
Agreement (ACIA) 
Constant 50 million 
(min. req 
for SE) 
- - Rp/ag 
18 Normal New Agreement per 
person 
Constant 1 - - Ag/ppl 
(ag/people) 
19 Time require for an 
agreement 
Constant 4 - - mo 
20 Expected Value per 
Agreement (EVA) 
Auxiliary 66,102,69
3.89427 
- 66,102,693.89427 Rp/ag 
21 Actual Value per Agreement 
per year 
Auxiliary = ACIA >EVA 112,237,897.1155 Rp/ag 
22 Agreement Duration Time Constant 4 - - Year (yr) 
23 Potential Positive Person 
Reputation 
Stock 1 million minimum  ppl 
  
58 
 
No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
24 Updating Database Time Constant 20 - - times (dmnl) 
25 Meeting intensity Constant 1 - - Per day 
26 Meeting Effectiveness Constant .5 - - dmnl 
27 Population Constant 50 million - - ppl 
28 Person with Positive 
Reputation and Personality 
Stock 100 maximum 237,157 ppl 
29 Internship Effectiveness Constant .8 - - dmnl 
30 Meeting Intensity Internship Constant 20 - - Time (dmnl) 
31 Person with Positive 
Reputation and Personality 
hold Agreement 
Stock 80 maximum 760,376 ppl 
 
As can be seen on above table, PSP contract system has a positive impact to both 
sides; entrepreneur and the funds owner. From the point of view entrepreneur, PSP contract 
can give them higher security for doing the business without worry for being exploited. For 
the funds owner, investment in small enterprises with PSP contract is profitable since the 
return from it can outperform the future time value of their money with free rate of 
discount of 7%/yr. With this discount rate, Rp. 50,000,000.00 invested in 4 years PSP 
contract will have future value of Rp. 66,102,693.89427. However, as can be seen on the 
Table III.3a, with the assumption of the entrepreneur can make margin 7% on the assets 
acquisition and liquidation, the average value of an agreement on the end of the contract 
term is  Rp. 112,237,897.1155,-. 
On the Table III.3b, it can be seen the some variables’ initial conditions and 
assumptions. However, most of the variables in the Table III.3b has been discussed in the 
Subroto (2011) and can be referred to the previous chapter (Chapter 2).  
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Table III.3b: Generic model and production coordination system with time step: 1 
day and simulation period: 9 year 
No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Aggregate Demand (AD) Stock 82,901,100 optimum 85,333,425 goods/yr 
2 Potential Addition to AD Stock 120.000.000 minimum 228,246 goods/yr 
3 Normal New demand fraction Constant 80 - - %/yr 
4 Normal Demand Fulfillment Constant 78 - - %/yr 
5 Average Total Production without 
policy support 
Constant 100 - - Good/yr/
unit 
6 SEs’ Maximum Crowding out 
Fraction 
Constant -80 - - %/yr 
7 SEs’ Normal Growth Fraction  Constant 38 - - %/yr 
8 SE’s Normal Survival Constant 3 - - yr 
9 Market Adequacy Auxiliary 1 optimum 1.03 dmnl 
10 Small Enterprise (SE) Stock 774,912 maximum 3,931,866 unit 
11 Medium Enterprise (ME) Stock 52.214 maximum 135,549 unit 
12 MEs’ Maximum Crowding out 
Fraction 
Constant -50 - - %/yr 
13 MEs’ Normal Survival Constant 4 - - yr 
14 Aggregate Safety Stock Constant 1 - - Yr 
15 Aggregate Production time Constant 1 - - yr 
16 Policy Delivery for P1 (Macro) Auxiliary ~0 100  
(starting  
from 2003) 
100 % 
17 Policy Delivery for P2 
(Micro) 
Net New Agreement 
Auxiliary 0 Maximum 
(Starting 
from 2005) 
0 Ag/yr 
 
Based on the simulation of the three SFD which are; generic model, refer to 
Figure III.2 p. 39; simple production co-ordination, refer to Figure III.4 p. 43; and 
financing system according to PSP, refer to Figure III.6 p. 53 that has been done to support 
this paper, now, it is more understandable that the stock management constitutes a very 
important role to support the sustainable development of SMEs as well as PSP financing 
system to boost the small enterprises’ subscription.  The overall simulation result of SEs 
can be seen on the Figure III.9: 
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Figure III.9: The Difference Behavior of SE with different policy 
 
 
As can be seen on above Figure III.9, policy on production coordination (P2 
[Macro]) has a significant role to support sustainable development of small enterprises 
while the policy on the use of PSP financing system (P1 [Micro]) is able to boost the 
number of small enterprise but could not able to support sustainable growth as in the year 
of 2007 it begins to decrease. However if the two policies are combined (P1 [Micro] and 
P2 [Macro]), the number of small enterprises grows in a strong sustainable pattern. 
Entrepreneurs’ ability to manage of how much they must produce in order to meet 
the market demand and to manage the inventory, in the long run it will make the company 
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that is also in line with the government programs are being implemented on the warehouse 
receipt program (Ministerial Decree No: 13.1/Per/M.KUKM/VII/2006), by the program, 
entrepreneurs can obtain an additional guarantee for their production and business 
development.  
 Putting more attention on the production coordination policy, the simulation of 
the system structure that is reflected in the SFD on Figure III.4 in the previous section is 
capable of producing more sustainable behavior patterns. The behavior of historical data 
for small and medium enterprises are decreasing in the last period of observation, but the 
simulation generated data shows an increasing behavior. More clearly about the behavior is 
shown in Figure III.10a and III.10b:   
Figure III.10a: SE Simulated data       Figure III.10b: ME Simulated   data 
  
 
Figure III.10a and III.10b show the positive impact of the availability of 
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countable aggregate market demand information, then it will create the demand 
expectations, then this expectation will support entrepreneurs to make better planning on 
capacity and production. For sure, the better knowledge of the demand and production 
capacity could make their operations more efficient and profitable. The profit gained will 
attract people to follow to establish new businesses time over time.  
 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 The discussion on policy approaches from micro and macro side in the paper has 
been supported by a combined simulation of the three system structures which is the 
generic model combined with the production co-ordination and the PSP contract financing 
system, i.e. mudarabah. Simulation on the first model which is figured on Figured III.2 is 
able to produce similar behavior with its reference data. It hence can be said that the 
hypothesis offered in the paper which is shock in the aggregate demand can be considered 
as the cause of the dynamic behavior of SMEs in terms of its quantity nationally in 
Indonesia (Subroto, 2011).  
The simulation of the second module attached to the first model which is about 
the use of the production coordination system in the effort to support developing SMEs in a 
sustainable way has shown positive insights. Information provision on the aggregate 
demand for SMEs product will give a signal and chance to the entrepreneurs to make better 
planning in production capacity and stock management. The production coordination can 
further prevent entrepreneurs to produce some products without knowing their market. 
Such insight re-emphasizes the importance of efforts to coordinate production as expressed 
by Mezgar and Kovacs (1998); Mezgar et al (2000).  
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On the other case, the simulation’s result on the use of PSP contract for small 
enterprises is beneficial for the enterprises and for the economic as well. PSP contract 
could boost the number of small enterprises although it still could be affected by the crisis 
situation, as its behavior can be seen on the Figure III.9 p. 60. However, at the same time it 
is also able to create a bigger value added for the economy from the point of view 
employment creation and a better return for the investor with a minimum agency risk.  
The investor can get a better return because the current value of a PSP contract a 
year can outperform the investor capital future value expectation based on the risk-free rate 
discount. The agency risk could be minimized through the use of dual layer referencing 
(Figure III.6 p. 53); first layer is the reference from the current person with positive 
reputation and personality, and the second layer is the reference from the current person 
who has a PSP contract based on an internship mechanism. 
The issue is now when and how such policy should be implemented. Models’ 
simulation of this paper suggests that indeed the policy of production coordination per se is 
capable to support the sustainable development of SMEs. And of course, implementation 
of such policy is not a standalone effort, emphasizing to alter hard-infrastructure and soft-
infrastructure to support business activities among other efforts is crucial. This 
infrastructure includes the physical and non-physical such as the improvement of transport 
and energy sectors, while non-physical policy coverage, among others, is to improve the 
business climate, assistance for an entrepreneur in the field of quality management and 
inventory management.  
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However, implementation such policy along with the use of PSP contract 
financing for small enterprise will make the development of SMEs more solid. 
Implementation of the PSP contract will raise the need for independent institutions to 
provide rating of individuals or groups those are suitable for SMEs financing with the PSP 
contract. With this principle, entrepreneurs have a minimum or can be said almost a zero 
risk of being loss so that entrepreneurs can concentrate in running businesses and good 
assistance to prevent business failure. Some of the expected long run positive impacts of 
this institution are capable of managing SMEs in administrative, indirectly supporting 
business operations, and increase stakeholder confidence to the entrepreneurs.    
Then the issue of how to implement the policy is beyond this paper’s scope since 
this concern will bring us to the question of how to make a policy itself. However, this 
research also implies the search for core source of the problematic phenomenon to develop 
a sustainable growth of SMEs from the public institution point of view, especially in 
Indonesia as a developing country. It will become an interesting research to explore and 
reveal the complexity in order to enable policy to support a sustainable SMEs development 
from the public policy perspective.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
UNDERSTANDING COMPLEXITIES IN   PUBLIC   POLICY   
MAKING PROCESS THROUGH POLICY CYCLE MODEL TO 
SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE SMES DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA:  
A SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH4 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is aimed to explore theoretically the complexities and the reality in the 
policy making process from the point of view causality relationships among the 
components or actors within the system. 
The complexities’ exploration in the paper is based on the model of the policy 
cycle that is widely discussed in the public policy and public administration literatures. 
The sense of reality surroundings the policy-making process is perceived from some study 
cases that have been observed from Australia and Indonesia literatures. Such 
complexities will be described with system mapping through stocks and flows diagram 
and expectation on some variables behavior will be tested by system simulation. 
Simulation throughout the paper revealed different complexities and some pitfalls 
in each stage of the policy cycle model on which should be given a proper attention from 
the policy stakeholder. 
The paper tried to construct a different approach to understand the reality and 
embrace the complexities of the policy-making process in order to present a starting 
point for an open discussion in public policy field.  The effort could be a learning tool for 
the public policy maker to build good awareness and understanding on their roles in the 
complex relationship and inter-dependent environment. Eventually, the paper can fill the 
gap between policy cycle model theory and the complexity in the real situation of the 
policy-making process. 
 
Key words: Policy cycle model, Public Policy Process, System Dynamics, Simulation 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The first version of the paper has been presented at  II Conference of WCSA-World Complexity Science 
Academy, September 26th – 27th, 2011, Palermo, Italy 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite its important role for the Indonesia’s economic development, so far it can 
be said that Indonesia still has great challenges in managing the small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). The challenge is evident when we look at especially the meaning or 
definition of SMEs and its data availability. It seems that the wide variation in SMEs’ 
definition has a direct impact on the SMEs’ data availability in Indonesia. 
The current available data also seems very poor, where each data is still 
categorized as temporary, quasi temporary, and most temporary. Even the data is still 
tentative; despite has been three years from its first release. The variation in 
definition and availability of these data also indirectly indicate the presence 
of overlapping SME development roles and efforts, although on the other side has become 
common understanding that the SME is an important factor for sustaining high economic 
growth in Indonesia, from the point of view of its contribution to total GDP each year. 
Various definitions and data can be found in the literature (OSMERI, 2008) or 
related agency website which has links directly or indirectly in the development of SMEs; 
such as the Ministry of MSME, Social, Industry, even on the website of Bank Indonesia, as 
have been summarized on the Table IV.1. However, since the year of 2008 has been 
enacted Law No.20/2008 which gives a clearer definition of the SME. 
Table IV.1: Variation definition of SMEs in Indonesia 
No Reference* Micro Small Medium 
  Net 
Asset 
Sales Employee Net Asset Sales Employee Net 
Asset 
Sales Employee 
1 UU No. 9 Th. 1995 - - - <= 200 mil. 
rupiah 
<= 2 
billion 
rupiah 
 <= 200 
mil. 
rupiah 
<= 2 
billion 
rupiah 
 
2 Ministry of Industry 
Decree 
   <=5 billion 
rupiahs 
  <=5 
billion 
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No Reference* Micro Small Medium 
  Net 
Asset 
Sales Employee Net Asset Sales Employee Net 
Asset 
Sales Employee 
No.257/MPP/Kep/7/1
997 
rupiahs 
3 Presidential Decree 
No.10/1999 
      >=200 
million -
10 billion 
rupiah 
  
3 Central Bank of 
Indonesia Decree 
No.7/39/2005 
 < 100 
million 
rupiah 
 < 200 
million 
rupiah 
100 - <=1 
billion 
rupiah 
 >=200 
million -
10 billion 
rupiah 
>1 
billion 
rupiah 
 
4 UU No. 20/2008  
(Feb 2008) 
<50 
million 
rupiah 
<300 
million 
rupiah 
 50 - < 500 
million 
rupiah 
300 
million – 
2.5 
billion 
rupiah 
 500 
million – 
10 billion 
rupiah 
2.5 
billion 
– 50 
billion 
rupiah 
 
5 Statistics Central 
Bureau (BPS) 
  <=3 
people 
  5 – 9 
people 
  22 – 99 
people 
Source: various on the reference* 
Such enactment of regulation has been shown the will of the government to align 
all efforts to improve seriously the development of SMEs’ sector that are as far done by 
several different ministerial without solid coordination. Coordination among ministerial 
and institutions such Ministerial of SMEs and Cooperative, Ministerial of Industry, 
Ministerial of Social, Ministerial of Youth and Sport, Central Bank of Indonesia, and The 
Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia will play a significant role in developing 
sustainable SMEs since each institution has each own specific contribution in theory. 
However, when it comes into the practice, it may look completely on the other way around 
facts since the available data tells the different story. The increment of SMEs along the 
period of 1999 to 2005/2006 is about 2% a year, nearly equal with the Indonesia 
population growth which is 1, 54% a year (CIA Fact Book, 2011). In this concern, it can be 
considered that the SMEs development in Indonesia is self-developing, which means that it 
grown by itself either without any supports or unhelpful supports. Then for the period of 
2006 to 2009, the data showed a very dynamics pattern which indicated an unsustainable 
development of SMEs in Indonesia (Subroto, 2011).  
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Such unintended development of the data also can be considered as a reflection of 
an uncoordinated policy and a nonsolid policy shaping process on the SMEs development. 
It raises the need to develop higher awareness on the important of the policy formation 
process which gives more emphasize on not only the result, but considers also the 
complexities during the process, and admits the different perception of an issue among the 
actors for more open policy discussion and submission, eventually will create a solid and 
sound public policy on the issue. 
Formation of public policy is shaped through several stages; in each stage lies a 
multi interaction that involves more than one actor and components. It has been some 
model perspectives on the public policy development. The notion of a policy cycle, 
prominent in the classical view, has its origin in  systems  theory  and  the  pioneering  
work  by  David  Easton  on  political systems (Easton 1965, 1966).  May and Wildavsky 
(1978) described a policy cycle in which they include: (1) agenda setting, (2) issue 
analysis, (3) implementation, (4) evaluation, and (5) termination. Similarly, Brewer and 
deLeon (1983) based their understanding of the policy process on a series, they define as: 
(1) initiation, (2) estimation, (3) selection, (4) implementation, (5) evaluation, and (6) 
termination. Hogwood  and  Gunn  (1984)  also envisage  a  cycle:  issue  search  or  
agenda  setting;  issue  filtration;  issue definition;  forecasting;  setting  objectives  and  
priorities;  options  analysis; policy  implementation;  evaluation  and  review;  and  policy  
maintenance, succession or termination. According to Colebatch (1998) the policy cycle 
imagines  the  policy  process  as  an  endless  cycle  of  policy  decisions, implementation  
and  performance  assessment. Howlett  and  Ramesh  (2003) conceive  of  a  similar  cycle  
but  with  more  steps:  agenda  setting  (problem recognition);  policy  formulation  
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(proposal  of  a  solution);  decision-making (choice of a solution); policy implementation 
(putting the solution into effect); and  policy  evaluation  (monitoring  results). 
Regarding public policy-making stages; Bridgman and Davis have proposed a 
model called the policy cycle model (Bridgman and Davis, 2000). In another literature, 
Meredith Edwards called the model as a policy development framework, as based on her 
experience that the framework is most useful in practice, especially when chairing the 
government interdepartmental  committees  (IDCs), and which she has used with her 
students of public policy in an attempt to  encourage  the good  practice,  contains  stages  
similar  to  those  in Bridgman  and  Davis  (Edwards  1993). 
In general, public policy formation process as in the case described by Edward 
with a case study in Australia also occurs in Indonesia, although not at the same level. The 
process also can be found in the case of the Independent Commission on Transparency and 
Participation (CITP) formation in the District of Lebak, Banten Province, Indonesia. The 
commission was established as a local government's response to the public aspirations for 
more transparency in local government administration to create clean and good governance 
(Pramusinto, 2006). 
However, according to Kay, policy  cycle  models  fail  to  embrace  the  
complexity  of  the  policy-making process  and  the  reality  that  policy  rarely,  if  ever,  
develops  in  a  linear progression. Stages are often skipped or compressed and the 
idiosyncrasies, interests, preset dispositions, policy paradigms or mental maps of the actors 
involved often usurp the sense of a smooth process. There is a multitude of different 
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processes at different scales and at different speeds occurring simultaneously (Kay, 2006, 
p. 9). 
Edwards has been presented an insightful point of view concerning with 
complexities in the policy environment. She revealed that policy environments are full of 
complexities, usually involving a diverse  range  of  players  coming  from  different  
perspectives  and spawning  a  host  of  unexpected  events (Edwards, 2001). In that regard, 
this thesis has carried out some of the common modeling practice in system dynamics 
mentioned by Zagonel (Zagonel, 2006), such as; system mapping, quantitative modeling 
and in some degree also to test the hypothesis (expectation on the simulation result); which 
is based on the way as much as possible to capture the process that has been described in 
the cases presented in the Edwards’ book. Some necessary quantification is needed in order 
to simulate the system. Simulation technique is used to give the sense of the reality 
condition in public policy-making process.  
The use of simulation techniques is believed have the attractive features of 
allowing the construction of realistic, testable and modifiable models of real-
world phenomena. This makes them of particular interest in the policy field. Simulating the 
complexities in every phase of the policy cycle model could support the awareness creation 
of the common goal among the actors involved in public policy. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis uses system dynamics as a method to explore and understand the 
complexity in the policy cycle model applied in some cases, which are taken from 
literature in public policy field. Thus, for the longer term could be used as an initial 
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foundation for an open discussion in the public policy field. The suitability of the use of 
system dynamics as a method in this thesis is based on Sterman’s argument that cited 
below: 
“System dynamics is a method to enhance learning in complex systems. Just as an 
airline uses flight simulators to help pilots learn, system dynamics is, partly, a 
method for developing management flight simulators, often computer simulation 
models, to help us learn about dynamic complexity, understand the sources of 
policy resistance, and design more effective policies”(Sterman, 2000 p.4). 
 
Within the next sections, each policy cycle phase will be presented by the 
following components of modeling practice in system dynamics point of view (Zagonel, 
2006): 
1. System Mapping 
System mapping is qualitative and inductive; involves drawing influence 
diagrams, CLDs, S&F diagrams, or any form of mapping or organization of the elements 
forming a system; attempts to get at the key causal interrelationships; focused upon 
identification of inter-organizational linkages and inter-dependencies  
This step is needed as a visual summary of a lengthier verbal or written 
discussion.  It organizes information and may yield preliminary dynamic insights.  For 
example, a stock-and-flow diagram helps to understand points of accumulation and 
intervention.  Alternatively, causal-loop diagrams begin to explore reinforcing (R) and 
balancing (B) feedback.  Delays can also be graphically displayed.  Maps facilitate the 
surfacing and clarification of assumptions, and thus can help with communication. 
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2. Quantitative modeling 
Quantitative modeling is quantitative and descriptive; involves formulation and 
simulation; largely system-focused; emphasizes stocks and flows dynamics and the effects 
of delays; requires specification of the decision rules governing interrelationships; focused 
on representing and tracking consequences; sometimes rich in detail complexity 
3. Hypothesis testing 
Quantitative and deductive; requires stating a hypothesis that explains dynamic 
behavior from the causal structure of the system; largely problem focused; emphasizes 
feedback-rich dynamics, learning, and exploration of the effect of changes in system 
structure; focused upon understanding and insight. 
It has to be mentioned that at some points, the thesis modeling process has to 
judgmentally quantify the effect of a variable to another variable. Quantifying process is 
taken in the believe of what Akkermans urged in his paper’s conclusion that in many cases, 
clients will not expect a quantified model for very soft issues, in contrast to the 
expectations for a very 'hard'  problem (Akkermans, 1995). Thus, the modeling process is 
not omitting such effect of important variable to another variable in the consideration of 
what Sterman said in his book as omitting structures or variables known to be important 
because numerical data are unavailable is actually less  scientific and less accurate than 
using  your best judgment to estimate their values (Sterman, 2000, p.879). And taking 
carefully the logical sense into the judgment of the important variable effect to another 
variable, yet it has to be verified that it will not either overstate or understate the final 
simulation result from the expected behavior. In order to support the logical sense the 
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model, in-depth interview has been also made with some high level bureaucrat officers 
from related ministerial and institutions to enrich the insight. 
The discussions in the paper are divided into several sections; such separation 
follows accordingly the policy cycle stages as the followings; 1) Identifying an issue in 
order to put agenda on the table, 2) policy analysis in order to prepare the green paper or 
recommendation paper, 3) Discussion and decision in order to prepare the white paper or 
policy paper, 4) implementation, and 5) evaluation. The end section will be dedicated to 
reveal the complexity insights of the paper and its implication for further research.   
IDENTIFYING ISSUE 
 
Outline of the current subtopic can be drawn as in the following Table IV.2 for the 
system mapping and Table IV.3 for the variables are included in the simulation with the 
initial value, expected value, and the final value after the simulation. 
Table IV.2: Identifying issue system mapping outline 
The Actors Resource 
Strategic 
Intermediate Control Final Result Final 
Indicator 
The 
Government: 
Ministerial 
Department 
Task Force 
1. Perception 
on Issue 
2. Interest on 
Initiative 
1. Change in 
Perception on Issue 
and Pressure 
groups interest 
2. Change in 
Initiative interest 
 
Green 
Paper5 
Sense of 
broad 
agreement 
in society Pressure 
Groups 
3. Opposing 
Perception 
on an Issue 
3. Change in 
Opposing 
perception on issue 
and government 
interest 
                                                          
5
 Government  discussion  paper  usually  with issues,  options  and  sometimes  proposals  as  a basis  for  
public  consultation,  typically  developed  before  a  white  paper 
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The Actors Resource 
Strategic 
Intermediate Control Final Result Final 
Indicator 
Press/Mass 
Media 
4. Press 
coverage 
4. Perception Gap on 
an issue  
Public 5. Opinion 
Discourse 
6. Need of 
Information 
5. Change in 
Discourse intensity  
6. Information 
Fulfillment 
 
Table IV.3: Initial, expected, and final value of the identification stage 
No Variable Type Initial  
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Interest pressure release Constant .15 - - dmnl 
2 Pressure Group 
Perception (PGP) 
Stock 1 ~GP .438 dmnl 
3 Government Perception 
(GP) 
Stock 1 ~PGP .097 dmnl 
4 Issues clarity Auxiliary .97 1 .99 dmnl 
5 Standard Press Coverage Constant 2 - - % 
6 Normal total report in 
one edition 
Constant 200 - - report 
7 Effect of report to public 
intensity addition 
Constant .001 - - Per 
report 
8 Public discourse intensity Stock .1 ~0 .03 dmnl 
9 Publicly available 
Information Need 
(PAIN) 
Stock .99 0 .00013 dmnl 
10 Publicly available 
information 
Stock .01 1 .99986 dmnl 
11 Normal Public 
information need 
Constant .5 - - dmnl 
13 Normal Information 
Fulfillment per report 
Constant .0015 - - Per 
report 
14 Time to report Constant 1 - - Week 
(wk) 
15 Broad Agreement (BA) 
on Issues Initiatives 
Stock 0 ~1 .9927 dmnl 
16 Potential Broad 
Agreement on Issues 
Initiatives 
Stock 1 ~0 .00728 dmnl 
17 Time To Change in BA Constant 1 - - mo 
18 Public Interest on 
Initiatives (PII) 
Stock .5 ~1 .729 dmnl 
19 Potential Public Interest Stock .5 ~0 .27 dmnl 
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No Variable Type Initial  
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
on Initiatives 
20 Maximum Normative 
Minister Interest on 
Initiative 
Constant 1 - - dmnl 
21 Ministerial Interest on 
Initiatives (MII) 
Stock .001 1 .7311 dmnl 
22 Potential Ministerial 
Interest on Initiatives 
Stock .999 0 .2688 dmnl 
23 Time to Observed PII Constant 1 - - wk 
24 Time to adjust MII Constant 1 - - mo 
25 Normal pressure from 
poll 
Constant .5 - - dmnl 
26 Incumbent Party 
Electability projection 
(IPE) 
Stock .4 1 .70 dmnl 
27 Potential Addition 
Incumbent Party 
Electability projection 
Stock .6 0 .30 dmnl 
28 Normal pressure from 
IPE Projection 
Constant .5 - - dmnl 
29 Time to revise IPE Constant 2 - - yr 
 
Identifying  the  issues  is  the  initial  stage  when  an  issue  demands government 
attention  and  where  the  nature  of  the  problem  is clarified  and  articulated.  
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is that commonly the policy process is initiated from 
within government (Howlett and Ramesh 1995:  105; Hall et al. 1986).  
However, Cobb and Elder create two categories in the policy agenda setting as the 
beginning of a policy formation process. The two categories are; first, the “formal agenda,” 
also referred to as the institutional or governmental agenda, consists of items that have 
been placed for consideration on the policy agenda by Congress or the executive branch. 
Second, the “systematic agenda” or “agenda of controversy” consists of issues that have 
received enough attention to ensure public awareness, that reflect a concern shared by 
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some members of the public that action is required, that are seen as appropriate for redress 
by government, or that are subject to resolution by citizen initiative (Cobb and Elder, 
1972).  
In this thesis the discussion on the issue identification stage will be based on the 
second category of the category of the policy agenda set forth by Cobb and Elder, 
although in simulations it is also possible to initiate the agenda by the government. In the 
final stage of this phase is expected to emerge a general consensus on an issue thus the next 
stage can begin. 
In her book, Edwards urged more or less the same tone on the broad consensus at 
the end of the stage i.e. a  key  question  to  address early  on,  therefore,  in  the  context  
of  the  case  studies  she provided in her book,  is how the problem got on the agenda and 
how it was articulated. Until there  is  broad acceptance  of  the  nature  of  the  policy  
problem,  it  is difficult  to  move  on.  
In this stage, some actors who have prominent roles can be identified as follows; 
government, specifically ministerial departments, pressure groups, the press or mass 
media, and the latest are the public. Each actor has a strategic resource that can affect 
the interaction with other actors in the system. In general, the government, represented by 
the ministerial department and pressure group for example, each of them has its 
own perception on an issue. The difference on perception (perception gap) is what caused 
the onset of negotiation of interests between them. Negotiation of interest is facilitated by 
the press and the mass media because they have some degree of the communication role to  
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Figure IV.1a: Issue identification stock and flow diagram 
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the public in an opinion forming. These negotiations will continue until the perception 
of an issue to be approximately the same and did not attract public attention anymore. At 
that time, in theory, it has been already reached what is called by Edward as a broad 
agreement. In Figure IV.1a can be viewed in detail on how the process of general 
agreement on an issue. 
While the process itself will be started from the existence of an issue where every 
single issue could become public interest and gain attention from the government. The 
reason of putting "issue" as the starting point of the policy commencement development 
process is that the issue per se will always exist in a dynamic society. While the 
government on one side already has its own agenda more or less like what was promised to 
the constituents, so that the government will choose the agenda based on a popular issue, 
routine programs, and short cut and generic solution. Thus, the more obvious and populist 
an issue will lead to the more government’s positive perception. While on the other hand, 
pressure groups are set to always have a different perception from the government in some 
degree. The difference of perception will be even greater if the pressure group is always 
opposed to the government’s move, in other words the pressure groups would not reduce 
the pressure on the government, despite all efforts by the government. 
In the simulation in the thesis, it is deliberately made that between government 
and the pressure group are in the different position and perception on an issue. Precisely, 
issues on which the government has a positive perception will be perceived differently by 
the pressure groups. However, either government or pressure groups will use the each other 
perception as a reference to change their current perception on an issue. Thus, perception 
gap could be minimized along the process (B1).  
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The perception gap then will be perceived and publicized by the press where the 
more gap will have the more coverage since “the bad is the news” for them. On average the 
press has a normal coverage on an issue and that is why the perception gap will have an 
effect to the coverage which is supposed nonlinear in this thesis. The nonlinearity of the 
effect is assumed and can be seen on the Figure IV.1 below: 
Figure IV.1: Effect of perception gap on press coverage 
 
 
The behavior of press coverage is expected to follow the commonly believed 
which grows at a small percentage in the beginning period when an issue starts to be 
perceived by public, then keeps growing until the maturity period is reached and then starts 
to decline; akin behavior is called as growth and collapse in many system dynamics 
literatures. As some example of such behavior, it can be observed on one of the following 
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Figure IV.2: Media coverage on the swine flu 
 
 
Figure IV.3: Twitter trending analysis 
 
Source: Pickard (2009) 
With normal press coverage of 2% the actual press coverage will be like as can be 
seen on the Figure IV.4; 
Beside figure (the red line) tells 
how the behavior of the press 
coverage on an issue. It shows the 
behavior of growth and collapse 
The graph compares 'people talking 
about #topic' and 'people talking 
about talking about #topic'.  
Beside, graph reflects of how 
peoples are interested on a topic 
and it shows more or less similar 
with the ‘growth and collapse’ 
behavior phenomenon in the 
system dynamics literatures. 
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Figure IV.4:  Simulated press coverage 
 
As can be seen on Figure IV.4, the simulation result meets the expectation that 
generates an identic behavior with the example graphs’ behavior. Further, press coverage 
will have impacts on public discourse. The more press coverage means the higher public 
discourse intensity. Comparison between Figure IV.4 above and Figure IV.5 below shows 
the similar shape of behavior with some time delay effect on the former figure. The time 
delay in this case is depended on how long the public discourse will have a net change 
which been set up in every 2 weeks. 
Figure IV.5: Simulated public discourse intensity 
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And somehow public discourse will have effect on the issue clarity. The thesis’ 
quantification effect of public discourse intensity on issue’s clarity can be seen on the 
Figure IV.6. It is widely considered that if there are a lot of discussions about an issue, then 
in the same time the issue must be still unclear. Within such circumstance, the more 
discourse on public means the less clear the issue which eventually will be perceived 
differently by the pressure group (R1) and the government (R2). 
Figure IV.6: Quantification of effect of public discourse intensity to issue clarity 
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of ‘normal level need of public information’ from the actual ‘need of information publicly 
available’. In this case, the effect is supposed to be nonlinear; specifically the more need 
the lesser effect on the reduction fraction which is can be seen on the Figure IV.7 below: 
Figure IV.7: Effect of PAIN to discourse intensity reduction fraction 
 
‘PAIN’ is more like a “potential” or the normative need of fully available 
information for the public. Thus for the initial time, it is set to have value of 0.9. The value 
level is set to that level for the initial time because of the sense that in the society must 
already available some degree of shared public information in any case; it is set in this case 
to the value of 0.1.  
On the other hand, in the same time, the ratio of ‘PAIN’ to ‘Normal PAIN’ will 
also have an effect on the information fulfillment rate on a nonlinear basis, specifically the 
lesser the ratio; the lesser information will be supplied. The effect of the ratio on the 
fulfillment rate can be seen on the Figure IV.8: 
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Figure IV.8: Effect of PAIN to normal information fulfillment per report 
 
Along the simulation, PAIN will gradually be transformed to Information Fully 
Available for Public (IFAP). The transformation is hinged on the information fulfillment 
rate where the higher information fulfillment rate the lesser the PAIN, and the IFAP will 
increase until its normative level is reached (R3). The simulation’s result is shown on the 
Figure IV.9. 
Figure IV.9: Simulated Information Fully Available for Public (IFAP) 
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Information fulfillment rate has also influence on the public interest on initiatives 
to cope with the issue. The public interest on initiatives itself is governed by its own net 
change over the time which is influenced by the rate of information fulfillment adjusted 
with the available normative potential public interest. Strictly speaking, this net change 
will transform the available normative potential public interest on the initiatives which is 
set to 0.5 to the actual public interest which is set to 0.5 initially (apathy).  
On the other side, the government is assumed to monitor closely the public 
interest development; however, there will be a probability of delay, since the respond from 
the government usually is late. In other words, development in public interest on initiative 
will influence the net change of government’s interest to take the initiative. Some other 
variables that also influence the net change are pressure from the poll and the electability 
projection for the next round general election. In the short term basis, polls give real 
pressure to the government than the electability projection which is depended on the 
government accomplishments during the administration mandate. The dynamic 
development of government and public interest on initiative is shown on the Figure IV.10: 
Figure IV.10: Simulated interest of the government and the public 
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As can be seen on above figure, the government tries to follow what the public 
wants on the issue even though there is still a gap between the interests of the two actors 
along simulation time.  The gap per se reflects a bargaining process between governments 
and public in general thus it will determine accumulation rate of broad agreement sense in 
community through a nonlinear effect. In this thesis as can be seen on the Figure IV.11, the 
nonlinear effect is defined as following; the more gaps on interest, the lesser effect on the 
change in broad agreement. 
Figure IV.11: Effect of interest gap on the broad agreement 
 
In fact, it will not be easy to reach the extreme interest gap either 0 (zero) or 1 
(one), and the gap will never reach the value of 0 (zero); that is because no party always 
takes an extreme position and has to stand a different 180 degree all the time. Thus for the 
initial time, it is set the value of the interest gap up to 0.5 for a moderate case. 
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caused of no social awareness about the issue. The sense of broad agreement is developed 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
In
te
re
st
 G
A
P
 o
n
 C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 
B
ro
a
d
 A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
Interest Gap
  
90 
 
by the change on the sense, which is driven by the effect of interest gap between 
government and the pressure group, the normative potential broad agreement that society 
can maximum reach which is set to 1 (one), and the allocated time (deadline) for broad 
agreement to established. Figure IV.12 shows the simulation result of the first stage of the 
policy cycle model. 
Figure IV.12: Simulated broad agreement 
 
The change rate of the sense will actually transform the normative potential broad 
agreement into the actual one. Sense of broad agreement will be reached when the level 
reaches closer to 1 (one). The closer to value of 1 will indicate the confidence in the 
society for the initiative willingness on the issue and be a signal for government to move 
on the next step of the policy-making process.  
POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
Outline of the policy analysis stage can be drawn as in the following Table IV.4 
for the system mapping and Table IV.5 for the variables are included in the simulation with 
the initial value, expected value, and the final value after the simulation. 
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Table IV.4: Policy analysis stage system mapping 
The Actors Resource 
Strategic 
Intermediate 
Control 
Final 
Result 
Final 
Indicator 
The Government: 
a. Ministry Steering 
Committee (MSC) 
b. Interdepartmental 
Task Force (ITF) 
1. MSC: 
Confidenc
e on the 
policy 
analysis 
result, key 
policy 
found, and 
clarified 
objective 
2. ITF: 
Number of 
Submissio
n received 
and 
Confidenc
e in policy 
option 
1. MSC: 
change in 
confidence 
on policy 
analysis, 
key policy 
found, and 
clarified 
objective 
2. ITF: 
Submissio
n rate and 
change in 
confidence 
on 
extracted 
policy 
option 
 
White 
Paper6 
Policy 
options  
Public,  
including departmental 
national/local branch 
coordination meeting 
3. Submitted 
opinion on 
policy 
3. Submissio
n rate 
 
Submitted 
review or 
opinion 
Number of 
Submission 
and 
Options 
  
Table IV.5: Initial, expected, and final value of the policy analysis stage 
No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Average Contribution 
on Policy Option from a 
Submission 
Constant 1 - - option/
unit 
2 Time to Extract Constant 2 - - mo 
3 Interdepartmental 
Interest Friction 
Constant .5 - - dmnl 
4 Weight on Steering 
Committee 
Constant .3 - - dmnl 
5 Supportive External 
Review Report on Past 
Constant .3 - - dmnl 
                                                          
6
 Statement of a government’s policy intention in a particular area, traditionally printed on white bond paper.  
(Bridgman and Davis 2000:  174) 
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No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
Policy 
6 Submission time Constant .5 - - mo 
7 Time to revise 
Credibility 
Constant 2 - - mo 
8 Positive Submission Stock 0 Max 32 unit 
9 Proposed Policy 
Options 
Stock 0 Optimum ~3 option 
10 Confidence on Positive 
Policy Analysis 
Stock 0 1 .99 dmnl 
11 Potential Confidence 
Positive Policy 
Analysis 
Stock 1 0 .01 dmnl 
12 Credibility Ministerial 
Steering Committee 
Stock .5 1 .97 dmnl 
13 Potential Credibility 
Ministerial Steering 
Committee 
Stock .5 0 .03 dmnl 
14 Confidence on Key 
Policy Questions 
Stock 0 1 .99 dmnl 
15 Potential Confidence on 
Key Policy Questions 
Stock 1 0 .01 dmnl 
16 Objectives clarified Stock 0 1 .999 dmnl 
17 Potential Objectives 
clarified 
Stock 1 0 .001 dmnl 
 
On her book, Edwards has made a slight modification of the concept of the policy 
cycle model from Bridgman and David. In the modified form, she described the policy 
analysis phase contains three major activities with some overlap in time, which are collect 
relevant data and information, clarify objectives and resolve key questions, and  develop 
options and proposals (Edward, 2001., p.4; 24).  
System mapping that has been drawn in this stage contains three major loops, one 
for reinforcing and the others two are balancing. The loops are assumed to begin after the 
ministerial task force has issued the green paper or discussion paper in which it is indicated 
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the sense of a broad agreement has been reached among stakeholders. The detail system 
mapping of the current stage can be seen on Figure IV.13 below: 
Figure IV.13: The policy analysis stage stock and flow diagram 
 
Establishment of a steering committee holds an important role that would affect 
the success of the others next stages. The committee membership and its term of reference 
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easy effort to analyze available past relevant policies for the benefit of incoming one.  Such 
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supporting department. Thus the higher solidity means the more idea, policy review or 
opinion coming onto the committee table and will give more policy option for the 
committee. Quantification is taken to reflect the effect of the interdepartmental solidity to 
the policy review and idea submission that can be seen on Figure IV.14 below: 
Figure IV.14: Effect of interdepartmental task force solidity 
 
However, the credibility of the committee will be affected also by how it chooses 
the optimal option which is neither too much nor too less (too much option are chosen 
means the more ambiguity of purpose). These series of causalities create a balancing loop 
(B1), as can be seen on the former Figure IV.13. 
Another series of causality which has created reinforcing loop (R1) also can be 
seen on the former Figure IV.13. Akin of loop emerges as interdepartmental solidity has 
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produce options with more quality, parsimonious, and robustness.  The quantification 
effect can be seen on Figure IV.15 below: 
Figure IV.15 Effect of interdepartmental solidity to extract policy options from 
submission 
 
The robustness of extracted options in the simulation has been defined as how 
many options the committee will propose for the next round stage. The definition sounds 
like a little shallow in this way. However, the definition comes out from the fact that top 
executives usually demand only a few options, i.e. two or three options on their table. 
Thus, the higher number of options proposed by the committee will be surely to have an 
impact on its credibility. Specifically, the higher number of option proposed will then 
reduce the credibility since the more options proposed by the committee reflects a high 
ambiguity on understanding the policy vision of the top executive. The effect 
quantification of the number of option proposed to the MSC credibility can be seen on 
Figure IV.16. 
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Figure IV.16: Effect of proposed policy options to the ministerial steering committee’s 
credibility 
 
As can be observed on the above figure, the committee will be expected to 
propose about 2 or 3 options to the top executive which are cabinet meeting in this case. 
The more options proposed means the lesser credibility of the committee.  
Some series of causal have also been indicated in the former Figure IV.13: The 
policy analysis stage stock and flow diagram creates the second balancing loop (B2). 
Along the policy analysis proses there is another process is done by the committee to 
search the policy’s key questions and to clarify the policy objectives as vivid as possible. 
The clarity of intended policy objective will determine the success of the committee to 
filter the policy review and idea from public or ministerial local branch through national 
coordination meeting and other interested party to make a robust policy option proposal 
(white paper).  
The development of committee confidence on the white paper is supported by the 
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clarification. Graphically, the development of the three confidences on the three variables 
can be observed on the Figure IV.17 below: 
Figure IV.17: Simulated confidence on policy analysis, key question on policy, and 
clarified the policy objective 
 
As can be seen on the above figure, it clues the confidence development on the 
policy analysis report is preceded by the development of the key question and clarified 
objective of the policy. However, the confidence on policy objective is preceded by the 
confidence development on the policy’s key question. 
CONSULTATION AND DECISION 
 
Outline of the consultation and decision stage can be drawn as in the following 
Table IV.6 for the system mapping and Table IV.7 for the variables are included in the 
simulation with the initial value, expected value, and the final value after the simulation. 
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Table IV.6: Consultation and decision stage system mapping 
The Actors Resource 
Strategic 
Intermediate 
Control 
Final Result Final 
Indicator 
The 
Government: 
a. Cabinet 
Meeting (PM) 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Departmental 
Staff (DS) 
1. PM: a) 
Confidence 
on the 
Criterion 
definition and 
Options 
Selection, 
b)Budget 
 
2. DS: a) 
Capability, b) 
Detail policy 
operationaliza
tion  
 
1. PM: a) change 
in confidence 
on the 
Criterion 
definition and 
Options 
Selection 
b) available 
budget 
2. DS: a) 
addition to 
capability b) 
confidence on 
policy 
operationaliza-
tion 
 
Policy option 
selected 
supported with 
reasonable 
budget 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Operationali-
zation in detail 
and confidence 
on the policy 
operationali-
zation 
Consultat
ion to the 
parlia-
ment pro-
ceeded 
 
 
 
 
Staff’s 
capa-
bility and 
Policy’s 
detail 
increment  
Law Maker 
(Legislative 
Body) 
3. Approval 
Vote 
3. Supporting 
and Opposing 
rate 
 
Parliament 
Majority 
Policy 
enact-
ment  
Pressure Group 
(Opposition 
Party) 
4. Opposing 
vote 
4. Change in 
opposition 
standing 
Parliament 
disagreement 
Blocked 
policy 
  
Table IV.7: Initial, expected, and final value of the consultation and decision stage 
End of Second Year 
No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Potential Contradiction 
Opposition Party Point of 
View 
Stock .5 .5 .593 dmnl 
2 Contradiction Opposition 
Party Point of View 
Stock .5 .5 .406 dmnl 
3 Time to review point of 
view 
Constant 5 - - mo 
4 Potential Confidence on 
Criterion Selection 
Stock 1 0 .028 dmnl 
5 Confidence on Criterion 
Selection 
Stock 0 1 .972 dmnl 
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No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
6 Working time intensity to 
Find Criterion 
Constant 10 - - da 
7 Potential Confidence on 
Policy Decision 
Stock 1 0 .001 dmnl 
8 Confidence on Policy 
Decision 
Stock 0 1 .999 dmnl 
9 Working time intensity to 
decide Policy 
Constant 15 - - da 
10 Normal Against meeting Constant 2 - - per mo 
11 Against Lobby 
Effectiveness 
Constant .1 - - dmnl 
12 Supportive Legislative 
member 
Stock 50 100 94.99 Person 
13 Against Legislative member Stock 50 0 5.01 person 
14 Legislative member Constant 100 - - person 
15 Supportive Lobby 
Effectiveness 
Constant .05 - - dmnl 
16 Potential in Detail Policy 
Operational 
Stock 1 0 .01 dmnl 
17 Detail Policy Operational Stock 0 1 .99 dmnl 
18 Working time intensity to 
operationalize policy 
Constant 2 - - da 
19 Potential Department Staff 
Capability 
Stock .9 0 .06 dmnl 
20 Department Staff Capability Stock .1 1 .94 dmnl 
21 Induction time intensity Constant 10 - - da 
 
In the next step, the MSC has to bring what they have done in the former stage of 
policy making i.e. policy analysis and can be said MSC has three important roles in the 
current stage. First, its credibility is still an important part to boost the cabinet meeting 
positive gesture with its high confidence on the white paper. It means that the more MSC 
credibility will make the cabinet meeting in a higher positive gesture. However, the 
condition of the economic situation, i.e. the fiscal condition will give more pressure in the 
cabinet meeting. The tighter the fiscal environment will lead to the lesser allocated total 
budget. Somehow, total budget will affect the cabinet meeting gesture, specifically the 
  
100 
 
lesser the budget the lower positive gesture in cabinet meeting. The effect has been 
quantified in this thesis’s simulation as can been observed on the following Figure IV.18:  
Figure IV.18: Effect of fiscal environment to cabinet meeting gesture 
 
The total budget per se is calculated from the expected delivery of policy 
implementation and average budget spent for per percentage (1%) delivery, further will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Next, the cabinet meeting must decide the criterion to select the best policy 
proposal. To make the best choice of policy this means to choose with high confidence and 
must be preceded with high confidence on the criterion selection. In other words, the more 
confidence on the criterion selection will lead to the more confidence in the policy 
decision. Thus, it will ease the departmental staff in making the details of the policy 
decision. The confidence development along the simulation can be seen on the figure 
IV.19a, b: 
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Figure IV.19a:  Criterion selection            Figure IV.19b: Policy decision 
  
On two above figures, after the certain level of confidence is reached then the 
policy decision can be taken and at a given time the confidence on it will be accumulated 
to reach the maximum level which is 1 (one) in order to be ensued to the other step i.e. 
policy operationalization.  
The credibility of MSC, on the other side has a second important role to be akin of 
‘bridge’ from the top-level government to the lower staffs in the ministerial department as 
the implementation team members who are standing in the front line to make the policy 
implementation is successful. The higher credibility of the MSC will make the probability 
of success to spread the policy’s vision to the ‘front liner’ higher through an induction 
process, such as training, seminar, national or local coordination meeting etc. Bruijn, in his 
book called such role as “boundary spanners” who are the actor operating on the boundary 
between the managerial and the professional system (Bruin, 2002, p.66).  
Specifically, the more MSC credibility will lead to the more induction that they 
can make and the more addition to the capability of the implementation team. However, 
this capability addition is depending on the current capability that the staffs have already 
(.1), its normative potential (.9), and the induction time, specifically the more actual 
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staff will be (R1). Eventually, the actual capability of implementation team will affect the 
confidence on the policy operationalization which is the more capable the team, the higher 
confidence on policy operationalization will be. The development of implementation team 
capability and policy operationalization in detail along the simulation can be seen on the 
Figure IV.20a, b below: 
Figure IV.20a: Team Capability       Figure IV.20b: Policy operationalization 
  
  
As can be observed on the above figure, at the beginning it is set that the staff 
capability to implement such policy is not 0 (zero). It follows the sense that it does not 
make sense if staff capability is zero, since they have a minimum requirement to have their 
job. At the end of the current stage’s simulation, the value of team’s capability and policy 
operationalization successively are .94 and .99 as it has been shown on the former Table 
IV.7. 
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with the law makers or legislative body through lobbying activities.  The higher MSC’s 
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Jan 01 Jul 01 Jan 01 Jul 01 Jan 01
2011 2012
0.3
0.6
0.9
D
e
p
a
rt
e
m
e
n
t 
S
ta
ff
C
a
p
a
b
il
it
y
Jan 01 Jul 01 Jan 01 Jul 01 Jan 01
2011 2012
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
D
e
ta
il
 P
o
li
c
y
 O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
a
l
  
103 
 
idea and vision sharing. These efforts eventually can increase understanding from the 
legislative body members to support the policy implementation. It means that the more 
understanding rate, the more legislative member supports the policy (R2), meanwhile the 
more understanding rate will reduce the legislative member who against the policy 
implementation, and the lesser the number of opposing member, the lesser lobby to support 
the policy (B1). The complete series of causal relationship can be seen on the Figure IV.21: 
Figure IV.21: The consultation and decision stage stock and flow diagram 
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Another case, the opposition party as the real pressure group that stands to 
challenge the incumbent party’s majority, will keep observing their opponent electability 
projection. The higher electability projection of the incumbent party (IPE) is perceived by 
the opposition party as a threat to their electability thus they will make their challenge 
harder the policy initiative by making tougher their contradiction perspective. In other 
words, if the opposition perceived that the successful implementation of the proposed 
policy will give the benefit to the incumbent party’s electability in the next round of the 
general election then they are eagerly to block the policy as possible as they can. 
Specifically, the more IPE, the more change to the contradiction perspective, the tougher 
opposition standing. On the other hand, the more opposing stand; the lesser addition to it 
since practically there is no opposing views forever (B2). 
As perception on policy can go very differently between the incumbent and 
opposition party if the opposing party perceived that the policy will only give its benefit to 
the incumbent party, they begin to lobby to against the policy implementation.  The more 
lobby to against the policy implementation, the more opposing rate which has implications 
to the lesser supportive legislative member (B3) and the more legislative members who 
oppose the policy (R3). The development behavior of the legislative members who are 
supportive or against the policy implementation can be seen on the Figure IV.22:  
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Figure IV.22:  Simulated legislative’s member on the policy initiative 
 
As can be seen on above figure, it has been set for initial simulation that there is 
no majority figure in the legislative body (50-50, with the total legislative member is 100 
person) concerning to the confidence of the policy until the MSC is established. MSC starts 
to make lobbies as the preparation for the proposed policy in order to reach a majority 
figure in the parliament which is at least 51% is in favor to support the policy. Thus, if the 
‘favor’ majority cannot be reached then for sure government cannot implement the policy. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Outline of the implementation stage can be drawn as in the following Table IV.8 
for the system mapping and Table IV.9 for the variables are included in the simulation with 
the initial value, expected value, and the final value after the simulation. 
Table IV.8: Implementation stage system mapping 
The Actors Resource 
Strategic 
Intermediate 
Control 
Final 
Result 
Final Indicator 
1. Government: 
Implementation Team 
(included local branch 
of department) 
Delivery of 
policy  
Delivery 
adjustment rate 
Policy 
delivered 
100%  
1. Delivery GAP 
2. Expected and 
Budget Spent 
Ratio 
Jan 01 Jul 01 Jan 01 Jul 01 Jan 01
2011 2012
30
60
90
person
Supportive Legislative member
Againts Legislative member
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Table IV.9: Initial, expected, and final value of the implementation stage 
No Variable Type Initial Value Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Delivery Stock 0 100 99.66 % 
2 Normal Time to 
adjust delivery 
Constant 4 - - mo 
3 Department Staff 
Capability 
Stock .1 1 .9928 dmnl 
4 Normal average 
budget spent per 1% 
delivery 
Constant 5,000,000 - - euro 
5 Detail Policy 
Operational 
Stock 0 1 1 dmnl 
6 Delivery GAP Auxiliary 100  
(at the 
implementation 
starting date) 
0 .34 % 
7 Budget Spent Ratio Auxiliary 1.14  
(at the 
implementation 
starting date) 
1 1 dmnl 
 
The fourth step in the policy cycle model requires firm confidence from the 
former stage. As can be seen on the Figure IV.23 below, the implementation team’s 
capability in doing the required job in this stage and the detail of policy operationalization 
are dominating the process. 
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Figure IV.23: Policy implementation stocks and flows diagram 
 
 
However, two loops are introduced in this stage; first, the confidence on the detail 
policy information somehow has an effect to ‘expected delivery’ which is the more 
confidence on the policy operationalization leads to the more expected delivery. 
Quantification on this effect can be seen on the Figure IV.24: 
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Figure IV.24: Effect of policy operationalization on the expected policy delivery 
 
On the above figure, there can be seen a high expectation on policy 
implementation. The quantification follows the sense of an organization frequently likes to 
put their expectation as high as possible regardless the resource it has is able to support or 
no. In this concern, the sense implies the government still puts the high expectation to have 
100% policy implementation delivery even though the confidence on policy 
operationalization is not perfect on the highest level which is 1 (one). In the thesis 
simulation, the government expectation is set on the level of 1 (one) if the level of 
confidence on policy operationalization is equal or more than 0.5. Below that level of 
confidence, the government expectation will decrease nonlinearly to 0% if there is no 
confidence at all on the policy operationalization which is in theory might be happened. 
The expected delivery will then determine how much the budget will be allocated 
precisely. Thus, the more expectation on the policy deliveries means the higher budget will 
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IV.23, the total budget has implications on the effort to detail the policy operationalization 
to boost its confidence. These series of causality create reinforcing loop (R1) in this stage. 
On the other side, Implementation Team Capability (ITC) has been assumed to 
have two effects; first on the time to adjust delivery (TAD) and second on the budget spent 
(BS) which are quantified as the following Figure IV.25a,b: 
Figure IV.25a: Effect of ITC  to TAD    Figure IV.25b: Effect of ITC to BS  
 
As can be observed on above two graphs, the effect of ITC on the variable of time 
to adjust the delivery and average budget spent per 1% deliveries are in nonlinear pattern 
with a negative slope. The difference is on its elasticity, specifically the effect of ITC on 
Figure IV.25a is inelastic and to the other Figure IV.25b the effect is elastic. 
The second loop is created from series of causality as follows; the more gaps on 
the policy implementation delivery will lead to force the implementation team to boost 
their effort to minimize the gap and then the faster adjustment rate implies the more 
delivery is delivered. The more delivered delivery will reduce the delivery gap (B1). Thus, 
the behavior of the delivery is expected to be a goal seeking. 
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Given the time to implement the policy a year, the behavior delivery of the policy 
implementation is seen on the Figure IV.26 below: 
Figure IV.26: Simulated policy delivery within the given time schedule 
 
It seems on the above figure that the simulation result supports the expectation on 
the delivery behavior which is ‘goal seeking’. It tells that on the first quarter the delivery 
grows very fast as the delivery gap is very wide in that time and then along with the 
delivery gap reduction, the delivery increment becomes lesser and lesser. 
There are two variables, which are considered as the positive indicator for the 
policy implementation in the thesis that are ‘delivery gap’ and ratio of expected budget and 
budget spent. The delivery gap is expected to be 0 (zero) while the ratio is expected to 
reach 1 (one) at the end of the implementation time. The behaviors of the two indicators 
are shown on the Figure IV.27: 
Figure IV.27: Simulated expected budget to budget spent ratio 
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As can be seen on the Figure IV.27, the expectations on the two indicators more 
or less are reached. In the end of simulation for this stage, it gives the value of 1 for the 
ratio and of 0.34% for the delivery gap. These two values also can be seen on the former 
Table IV.9. 
EVALUATION 
 
Outline of the evaluation stage can be drawn as in the following Table IV.10 for 
the system mapping and Table IV.11 for the variables are included in the simulation with 
the initial value, expected value, and the final value after the simulation. 
Table IV.10: Evaluation stage system mapping 
The Actors Resource 
Strategic 
Intermediate 
Control 
Final 
Result 
Final 
Indicator 
1. Government 
a. Ministerial related to the 
policy 
2. Non-Government Organization 
3. Academicians 
4. Legislative body 
Review on the 
Implemented 
Policy 
Facts finding Report Public 
perception 
 
Table IV.11: Initial, expected, and final value of the evaluation stage 
No Variable Type Initial 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
Final 
Value 
Unit 
1 Potential Positive Policy 
Evaluation Report 
Stock 1 0 .001 dmnl 
2 Positive Policy Evaluation 
Report 
Stock 0 1 .999 dmnl 
3 Public Perception Auxiliary 0 1 .87 dmnl 
 
The last stage of the policy cycle finally is reached. According to Edwards, the 
evaluation policy stage can lead to the policy revision, and then she said that the objective 
of the stage is to assess the extent to which the policy objectives originally set were 
  
112 
 
actually met and met efficiently (Edwards, 2001, p. 6-7). In the thesis has been introduced 
the delivery gap and the budget spent and expected ratio as the final indicators. 
Successively, those indicators accommodate ‘the policy objective originally set were 
actually met’ is meant 100% delivered and ‘met efficiently’ is meant delivered with exact 
expected budget (the ratio budget spent to expected ratio is 1 (one)).  
About the evaluation stage, Edwards has given important remarks in her book, 
which is the  evaluation  stage is not necessarily a neutral, technical exercise but can be as 
politically charged  as  any  of  the  other  policy  development  phases.  To understand the 
evaluation stage, it is therefore important to consider also who initiates the evaluation, 
why, and how it is organized (Edwards, 2001, p. 7). 
However, all policy reviews that have been posted either the negative or positive 
review on the policy cycle from the initial stage to the final stage will be perceived by the 
policy’s object itself which is the public. Specifically, as can be seen on Figure IV.28: 
System Mapping for Evaluation Stage, the more positive outcome that public can take the 
benefit from the policy implementation will for sure lead the higher positive public 
perception.  
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Figure IV.28: Evaluation stage’s stocks and flows diagram 
 
The simulation result concerning to the public’s perception can be seen on the 
following Figure IV.29: 
Figure IV.29: Simulated positive policy valuation report and the public perception 
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On the Figure IV.29, public perceived the positive with some time lags, but 
eventually public will fully perceive what have been reported positively from the policy 
implementation after it has felt the policy’s outcome. 
The more positive public perception makes the better incumbent party electability 
projection (IPE) in the next round general election. With involving causality series from 
the former stage i.e. Figure IV.21; the more IPE means the higher expected delivery and 
the higher delivery gap. Then, the lesser delivery gap leads to the higher effect on the facts 
finding (positive review) of the policy and the last will make the positive policy evaluation 
report is higher to the maximum normative evaluation i.e. 1 (one). The quantification effect 
of the delivery gap to the submission of positive facts finding can be seen on the Figure 
IV.30 below, meanwhile these series of causality will form balancing loop (B1).  
Figure IV.30: Effect of delivery gap on the positive report on the policy 
 
As it can be observed on above figure, the more delivery gap will lead to the 
lesser positive submission on the policy review. However, it also can be seen that the 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
D
e
li
v
e
ry
 G
a
p
 t
o
 P
o
si
ti
v
e
 
S
u
b
m
is
si
o
n
 o
n
 P
o
li
cy
 E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
Delivery Gap
  
115 
 
lowest effect is 0.2 when the delivery gap is 1 or 100%. The sense behind such 
quantification is that even though there are 100% gap of delivery which the policy is failed 
to be implemented; there will be still a positive report concerning to the ‘lesson learned’ at 
least. 
On the other hand, the better IPE will mean the closer budget spent to expected 
ratio to 1 (one) then the closer this ratio to 1 (one) leads to the much more positive 
evaluation reports through the quantification of its effect to the submission of positive facts 
finding, which can be seen on the Figure IV.31 below. These series of causality form 
second reinforcing loop (R2).  
Figure IV.31: Effect of RBS deviation from 1 to positive report on policy 
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Such quantification tells that the more deviation from 1, the lesser positive submission 
reviews on the policy implementation. 
The other regard from the figure IV.28 is that the higher IPE will be perceived 
‘bad news’ by the opposing party, that is why the higher IPE will make the opposition 
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
R
B
S
 t
o
 P
o
si
ti
v
e
 
S
u
b
m
is
si
o
n
 o
n
 P
o
li
cy
 E
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
Budget Spent to Expected Ratio (RBS)
  
116 
 
party put more contradiction (challenge) to the government. Also through a long series of 
causality from the former system mapping stage i.e. from Figure IV.1a; IV.13; IV.21; and 
IV.23, the higher challenge from the opposition party will lead to the higher delivery gap. 
These series will create the first reinforcing loop in the system mapping (R1) and the 
higher deviation of budget spent to expected ratio from 1 (one) and the series create the 
second balancing loop (B2). For the result of the simulation of the current stage can be 
seen on the following Figure IV.32: 
Figure IV.32: Simulated positive report on the policy 
 
Policy implementation’ dynamics can be seen on above Figure IV.32 where it is 
reflected by the delivery delivered time to time beginning from the start of policy 
implementation. The delivery of the policy is grown increasingly as the delivery gap is still 
wide. The growth is starting to decrease after the first quarter is reached and then keep on 
decreasing until it reaches the desired delivery which is 100% delivery (goal seeking 
phenomenon).  
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
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Edward (Edward, 2001) and a case from Indonesia written by Pramusinto (Pramusinto, 
2006). 
From the first stage, complexities arise when among the government and the 
pressure groups have a different perception, a different point of view on an issue. Each 
actor has different agendas with a variety background interest, mainly political power.  The 
perception gap is then publicized by the press to create public opinion since indeed public 
has the need of information to be fulfilled. This is creating another pressure to either 
government (issue related ministerial office) or pressure groups to align the perception 
until the sense of broad agreement is reached. 
The second stage of the policy cycle model has other complexities that can be 
understood. Complexities now come from the new actors who come into the stage system. 
When the ministerial steering committee is established with some members coming from 
different background and experiences, the committee per se will have its credibility. The 
credibility of the committee will have some important roles to put the committee on a 
strong command and determination to make the interdepartmental team works with 
enthusiast. Credibility of the committee and the solid interdepartmental team will be very 
helpful to attract submission of ideas. On the other way, the committee should be able to 
find the key policy questions and clarify the findings to the top level of government, i.e. the 
prime minister and his cabinet since the clear objective is needed to filter the idea from the 
submission. 
The main complexity in the third stage is coming from the vested interest of the 
actors in the house of legislative; either incumbent party or opposition party. Each side will 
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as much as possible to support policy that could raise their own prospect to win the next 
round general election to have a parliament majority. However, ministerial steering 
committee still has important roles in this concern. The committee could be a boundary 
spanner to alter the departmental staff capability to work on the policy. On the other hand, 
the committee should be able to convince and to make the cabinet meeting within a tight 
fiscal condition choose a solid and robust selection on the available policy options. Law 
makers lobbying is become another role that the committee should do to secure the 
legislative approval, failed to accomplish this role will block all effort to implement the 
policy. It implies that the committee should consider the interest of the opposition party in 
the parliament.  
The fourth and fifth cycle discussed about implementation and evaluation. The 
implementation stage starts from how detail the policy operationalization is, the more 
detail could make the implementer team’s work is easier. The implementation success 
indicators are ‘the delivery gap’ and ‘the budget spending to the expected budget ratio’ that 
depend also on the capability of the implementer team. In evaluation stage, perception 
from public on the different between what are the institutional reports on their review on 
the policy implementation and what is public receive and perceive from the policy 
implementation will determine the next general election winner among the incumbent party 
or the opposition party. The complexities that have been explored in the paper is hoped to 
be able to enlarge a widely open discussion further in the field of public policy field from 
the point of view system dynamics and the paper also support the use of system dynamics 
for learning tools to build pitfall awareness in the policy making for public among the 
public policy makers. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSSION 
 
General insights of the thesis can be drawn as the following; the effort to search 
and explain the dynamics behavior of SMEs development in Indonesia using system 
dynamics approach gave some insight findings. Such the dynamics development SMEs 
might not the intended result from what the policy had been implemented for, even the 
awareness on the impact from the policy might be too low in order to aware the unintended 
effect is working on. Along the simulation in the first chapter has shown that such dynamic 
behavior is caused by a shock in the aggregate demand which started from 2003/2004. 
Some series of even that can make the shock such as money politic or in-kind transfer for 
political party constituent and the implementation of the unconditional cash transfer along 
the year of 2004-2010. This finding is based on Cunha et all’s observation that the policy 
cash or in-kind transfers such as the government implemented program or politician in-
kind transfer will raise the total demand for normal goods (Cunha et all, 2010). 
It seems that SMEs in Indonesia serve the domestic market rather than 
international market. The facts that from 2004 to 2008, SMEs, export is on average only 
7.12% of its GDP. Herewith, it can be said that the market of SMEs is the domestic market 
that is around 92.88% of its GDP. Simulation in chapter three reveals two policies that 
could be supportive to cope with the unsustainable dynamics behavior of SMEs which are 
the production coordination system and the use of the PSP contract financing system for 
small enterprises (SEs).  
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The production coordination can further prevent entrepreneurs to produce 
products without knowing their market. It can be done through an information provision 
system about the aggregate demand of SMEs product. The provision will give a signal and 
chance to entrepreneurs to make better planning in production capacity and stock 
management. Such insight re-emphasizes the importance of efforts to coordinate 
production as expressed by Mezgar and Kovacs (1998); Mezgar et al (2000).  
On the other case, the simulation’s result on the use of the PSP contract for small 
enterprises is beneficial for the enterprises and for the economic as well. PSP contract 
could boost the number of small enterprises although it still could be affected by the crisis 
situation. However, at the same time it is also able to create a bigger value added for the 
economy from the point of view employment creation, the investor can get a better return 
because the current value of a PSP contract a year can outperform the investor capital 
future value expectation based on the risk-free rate discount with a minimum agency risk 
with the use of dual layer referencing. 
The complexities to enable policy in public sectors have been revealed in the 
chapter fourth by exploring it through the policy cycle model stage by stage. Each stage 
has its own complexities since the interaction among the actors (Sterman, 2000) with some 
degree of differences about perception, interest, and agenda. The understanding on such 
complexities in the policy-making proses from the point of view policy cycle model is 
needed to encourage an open discussion among the policy makers, politicians, the press, as 
well as the public to put policy to the most beneficial for all the stakeholders.  
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APPENDIX 1: SMEs’ data from Central Statistical Bureau of Indonesia 
(BPS) from 1999 to 2008 
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APPENDIX 2: Simulation Equation of SMES_P1_P2 
 
mainmodel Component 1 { 
aux A SME Production { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/(yr*unit) 
def IF('Policy Delivery'>,5;'Av SMEL Prod with support';'Av SMEL Prod without support') 
} 
level Aggregate Demand { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr 
init 'Normal AD' 
inflow { autodef  'New Demand' } 
outflow { autodef  'Demand Fulfilment' } 
inflow { autodef  'Incentives payment' } 
} 
const Aggregate Production time { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 1<<yr>> 
} 
const Aggregate Safety Stock { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 1<<yr>> 
} 
aux Agregate Production { 
autotype Real 
autounit good 
def 'Expected Demand'*'Aggregate Safety Stock' 
} 
aux Auxiliary_1 { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/(yr*unit) 
def IF('Policy Delivery'>,5;'Av SMEL Prod with support';'Av SMEL Prod without support') 
} 
aux Av SMEL Prod with support { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/(yr*unit) 
def 'Agregate Production'/('Small Enterprise'+'Medium Enterprise'+'Large Enterprise')/'Aggregate 
Production 
time' 
} 
const Av SMEL Prod without support { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/(yr*unit) 
init 100<<good/yr/unit>> 
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} 
aux Demand Fulfilment { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr² 
def 'Efefctive AD Fulfilment'*('Small Enterprise'+'Medium Enterprise'+'Large Enterprise')*'A SME 
Production' 
} 
aux Demand Growth per year { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr² 
def ('New Demand'-'Demand Fulfilment') 
} 
aux Efefctive AD Fulfilment { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
def 'Effect of AD to Normal AD Fulfilment'*'Normal Demand Fulfillment' 
} 
aux Effect of AD to Normal AD Fulfilment { 
1autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Aggregate Demand'/'Normal 
AD';0;0,5;{0;0,5;1;1,5;2;2,4;2,67;2,83;2,95;3;3//Min:0;Max:3//}) 
} 
aux Effect of Market Adequacy to average survival { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Market Adequacy';0;0,2;{0;0,09;0,15;0,36;0,6;1;1,83;3,17;5;5,8;6//Min:0;Max:6//}) 
} 
aux Effective Bankrupcy Fraction_Large { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def 1/'Effective survival_Large' 
} 
aux Effective Bankrupcy Fraction_Medium { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def 1/'Effective survival_Medium' 
} 
aux Effective Bankrupcy Fraction_Small { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def 1/'Effective survival_Small' 
} 
aux Effective survival_Large { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
def 'Normal Survival_Large'*'Effect of Market Adequacy to average survival' 
} 
aux Effective survival_Medium { 
autotype Real 
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autounit yr 
def 'Normal Survival_Medium'*DELAYINF('Effect of Market Adequacy to average 
survival';0,5<<yr>>) 
} 
aux Effective survival_Small { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
def 'Normal Survival_Small' 
*DELAYINF('Effect of Market Adequacy to average survival';0,7<<yr>>) 
} 
aux Expected Demand { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr 
def DELAYINF('Aggregate Demand';6<<mo>>) 
} 
aux Incentives payment { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr² 
def 'Incentives policy'*'Potential Addition to AD' 
} 
aux Incentives policy { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def STEP(1<<1/yr>>;2003<<@yr>>) 
} 
level Large { 
inflow { autodef  Rate_4 } 
outflow { autodef  Rate_5 } 
} 
level Large Enterprise { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
init 1885<<unit>> 
2inflow { autodef  'Net LE Subscribers' } 
} 
aux Large_Ref { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def 0<<unit>> 
} 
const LE_Maximum Crowding out Fraction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init -15<<%/yr>> 
} 
level Level_1 { 
autotype Real 
init 5400 
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inflow { autodef  Rate_7 } 
} 
level Level_2 { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
outflow { autodef  Rate_7 } 
} 
aux Market Adequacy { 
autotype Real 
def 'Market Carrying Capacity'/('Small Enterprise'+'Medium Enterprise'+'Large Enterprise') 
} 
aux Market Carrying Capacity { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def 'Demand Fulfilment'/'Normal Demand Fulfillment'/'A SME Production' 
} 
const ME_Maximum Crowding out Fraction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init -50<<%/yr>> 
} 
level Medium { 
inflow { autodef  Rate_3 } 
outflow { autodef  Rate_4 } 
} 
level Medium Enterprise { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
init 52214<<unit>> 
inflow { autodef  'Net ME Subscribers' } 
outflow { autodef  'Net LE Subscribers' } 
} 
aux Medium_Ref { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def 0<<unit>> 
} 
level Micro { 
inflow { autodef  Rate_1 } 
outflow { autodef  Rate_2 } 
} 
aux Micro_Ref { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def 0<<unit>> 
} 
3aux Net Growth Fraction_Large { 
autotype Real 
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autounit %/yr 
def 'Normal Growth Fraction_Large'-'Effective Bankrupcy Fraction_Large' 
} 
aux Net Growth Fraction_Medium { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
def 'Normal Growth Fraction_Medium'-'Effective Bankrupcy Fraction_Medium' 
} 
aux Net Growth Fraction_Small { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
def 'Normal Growth Fraction_Small'-'Effective Bankrupcy Fraction_Small' 
} 
aux Net LE Subscribers { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit/yr 
def 'Large Enterprise'*MAX('Net Growth Fraction_Large';'LE_Maximum Crowding out Fraction') 
} 
aux Net ME Subscribers { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit/yr 
def 'Medium Enterprise'*MAX('Net Growth Fraction_Medium';'ME_Maximum Crowding out 
Fraction') 
} 
aux Net New Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit agreement/yr 
def 0<<agreement/yr>> 
} 
aux Net SE Subcribers { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit/yr 
def 'Small Enterprise'*MAX('Net Growth Fraction_Small';'SE_Maximum Crowding out 
Fraction')+'Net 
Subcriber from PSP Contract Scheme' 
doc cowding out fraction will have an impact on a bad condition on economic (economic crisis) 
} 
aux Net Subcriber from PSP Contract Scheme { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit/yr 
def 'Net New Agreement'*1<<unit/agreement>> 
} 
aux New Demand { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr² 
def 'Aggregate Demand'*'Normal New demand fraction' 
} 
const Normal AD { 
  
xviii 
 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr 
init 82901100<<good/yr>> 
} 
const Normal Demand Fulfillment { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init 78<<%/yr>> 
} 
const Normal Growth Fraction_Large { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init 40<<%/yr>> 
4} 
const Normal Growth Fraction_Medium { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init 30<<%/yr>> 
} 
const Normal Growth Fraction_Small { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init 38 <<%/yr>> 
} 
const Normal New demand fraction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init 80<<%/yr>> 
} 
const Normal Survival_Large { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 4<<yr>> 
} 
const Normal Survival_Medium { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 4<<yr>> 
} 
aux Normal Survival_Small { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
def 3<<yr>>+STEP(0<<yr>>;2005<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Policy Delivery { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
def 0<<%>> 
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} 
level Potential Addition to AD { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr 
init 120000000<<good/yr>> 
outflow { autodef  'Incentives payment' } 
} 
aux Rate_1 { 
} 
aux Rate_2 { 
} 
aux Rate_3 { 
} 
aux Rate_4 { 
} 
aux Rate_5 { 
} 
aux Rate_6 { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit/yr 
def 1<<unit/yr>> 
} 
aux Rate_7 { 
autotype Real 
autounit da^-1 
def -1<<1/da>> 
5} 
const SE_Maximum Crowding out Fraction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init -80<<%/yr>> 
} 
level Small { 
inflow { autodef  Rate_2 } 
outflow { autodef  Rate_3 } 
} 
level Small Enterprise { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
init 774912<<unit>> 
inflow { autodef  'Net SE Subcribers' } 
outflow { autodef  'Net ME Subscribers' } 
} 
aux Small_Ref { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def 0<<unit>> 
} 
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aux SMEs product supply { 
autotype Real 
autounit good/yr 
def ('Small Enterprise'+'Medium Enterprise'+'Large Enterprise')*'A SME Production' 
} 
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APPENDIX 3: Simulation Equation of PSP Contract System for small 
enterprises 
mainmodel Component 1 { 
const Acq Cost { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
init 10% 
} 
aux Acquisition { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def 'Cash Asets'*(1+'Actual Net Acquisition Margin')/'Acquisition Time' 
} 
const Acquisition Time { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 2<<mo>> 
} 
aux Actual Capital Invested per Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/yr 
def 'New Agreement'*'Average Capital Invested per Agreement' 
} 
aux Actual Net Acquisition Margin { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
def GRAPH('Average 
Reputation',0,.1,{0.8,0.823,0.857,0.898,0.952,1,1.053,1.115,1.16,1.19,1.2//Min:0.8; 
Max:1.2//})*'Normal Net Acquisition Margin' 
doc akuisisi asset yang bersifat produktif (barang modal/bahan baku) dari modal yang ada secara 
agregate 
akan megurangi dampak inflasi, karena akan ada nilai tambah, nilai aset yang akan naik 
} 
aux Actual Net Liquidation Margin { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
def GRAPH('Average 
Reputation',0,.1,{0.8,0.823,0.857,0.898,0.952,1,1.053,1.115,1.16,1.19,1.2//Min:0.8; 
Max:1.2//})*'Normal Net Liquidation Margin' 
} 
aux Actual to Expected Growth of Capital Invested Ratio { 
autotype Real 
def 'Current Average Growth of Capital Invested'/'Expected Average Growth per Month of Capital 
Invested' 
} 
aux Actual Value per Agreement per year { 
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autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/agreement 
def ('Profit Shared to Investor'+'Capital Liquidation')/'End Agreement' 
} 
const Agreement Duration Time { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 4<<yr>> 
} 
level Asset { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  Rate_4 } 
outflow { autodef  sales } 
} 
aux Auxiliary_1 { 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF(GRAPH('Actual to Expected Growth of Capital Invested Ratio',0,.2,{-0.0345,-0.034,-
0.03,-0. 
0203,-0.0106,0,0.011,0.022,0.0294,0.0326,0.035//Min:-0.05;Max:0.05//}),1<<mo>>) 
} 
aux Auxiliary_2 { 
1autotype Real 
def DELAYINF(GRAPH('Actual to Expected Growth of Capital Invested Ratio',0,.2,{-0.0345,-0.034,-
0.03,-0. 
025,-0.016,0,0.035,0.1,0.198,0.326,0.5//Min:-0.1;Max:0.5//}),1<<mo>>) 
} 
const Average Capital Invested per Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/agreement 
init 50000000<<rupiah/agreement>> 
} 
level Average Reputation { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
inflow { autodef  'Net Reputation Change' } 
} 
level Capital { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
init 'Number of Agreement'*'Average Capital Invested per Agreement' 
inflow { autodef  'Actual Capital Invested per Agreement' } 
outflow { autodef  'Capital Liquidation' } 
} 
aux Capital Liquidation { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/yr 
def 'End Agreement'*'Average Capital Invested per Agreement' 
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} 
level Cash { 
autotype Real 
init 10 
outflow { autodef  Rate_3 } 
inflow { autodef  Rate_5 } 
} 
aux Cash Addition { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def Revenue 
} 
level Cash Asets { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
init Capital 
outflow { autodef  'Cash Payments' } 
inflow { autodef  'Cash Addition' } 
inflow { autodef  'Actual Capital Invested per Agreement' } 
} 
aux Cash Payments { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def Acquisition-'Cash Asets'*'Actual Net Acquisition Margin'/'Acquisition Time'+'Cash 
Withdrawal'+'Capital 
Liquidation' 
} 
aux Cash Withdrawal { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/yr 
def 'Retained Earning'/'Agreement Duration Time' 
} 
const Constant_3 { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 1<<yr>> 
} 
2aux Current Average Growth of Capital Invested { 
autotype Real 
unit %/mo 
def (('Actual Value per Agreement per year'-'Average Capital Invested per Agreement')/'Average 
Capital 
Invested per Agreement')/'Total time capital been invested' 
} 
const Discount Rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/yr 
init 7<<%/yr>> 
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} 
aux Effect of EPRR to Agreement { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Actual to Expected Growth of Capital Invested 
Ratio',0,.2,{0.05,0.08,0.09,0.14,0.37,1,2.7,6.4,8.6, 
9.6,10//Min:0;Max:10//}) 
} 
aux Effect of EPRR to NPC { 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF(GRAPH('Actual to Expected Growth of Capital Invested Ratio',0,.2,{-0.0345,-0.034,-
0.03,-0. 
025,-0.016,0,0.035,0.1,0.198,0.326,0.5//Min:-0.1;Max:0.5//}),1<<mo>>) 
} 
aux End Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit agreement/yr 
def 'Number of Agreement'/'Agreement Duration Time' 
} 
aux Expected Average Growth per Month of Capital Invested { 
autotype Real 
unit %/mo 
def (('Expected Value per Agreement'-'Average Capital Invested per Agreement')/'Average Capital 
Invested 
per Agreement')/'Agreement Duration Time' 
} 
aux Expected Value per Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/agreement 
def 'Future Value'/'Number of Agreement' 
} 
aux First Layer of Referencing { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl/da 
def ('Person with Positive Reputation and Personality'+'Person with Positive Reputation and 
Personality hold 
Agreement')*'Potential Positive Person Reputation'/Population*'Meeting Effectiveness'*'Meeting 
intensity' 
} 
aux Future Value { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
def FV(NUMBER('Discount Rate')%/12,NUMBER('Agreement Duration Time')*12,0,NUMBER(-
Capital))*1<< 
rupiah>> 
} 
const Internship Effectifness { 
autotype Real 
init .8 
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} 
const Investor Profit Sharing Percentage { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
init 50% 
} 
level Level_1 { 
autotype Real 
init 10 
3inflow { autodef  Rate_6 } 
} 
const liq Frac { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
init 30% 
} 
aux Liquidation { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def DELAYINF(Acquisition,2<<mo>>) 
} 
aux Margin From Acquisition of Asset { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def 'Cash Asets'*'Actual Net Acquisition Margin'/'Acquisition Time' 
} 
aux Margin from Liquidation Asset { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def Revenue-Liquidation 
} 
const Maximum Reputation { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
} 
const Meeting Effectiveness { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
} 
const Meeting intensity { 
autotype Real 
autounit da^-1 
init 1<<1/da>> 
} 
const Meeting Intesity_Interneship { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
init 20<<1/mo>> 
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} 
aux Net Additon to PRP { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl/da 
def 'First Layer of Referencing'*'Updating Database Time' 
} 
aux Net New Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit agreement/yr 
def 'New Agreement'-'End Agreement' 
} 
aux Net Profit { 
autotype Real 
unit rupiah/yr 
def 'Total Margin' 
} 
aux Net Reputation Change { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def 'Average Reputation'*'Potential Reputation'/'Maximum Reputation'/'Time to Review 
Reputation'*'Effect of 
EPRR to NPC' 
} 
4aux New Agreement { 
autotype Real 
unit agreement/yr 
def 'Effect of EPRR to Agreement'*(('Person with Positive Reputation and Personality'*'Normal 
New 
Agreement per person'/'Time require for an agreement')-('Second Layer of Referencing'*'Normal 
New 
Agreement per person')) 
doc new agreement didasarkan pada informasi dari sistem internship (secon layer) dan juga 
berdasarkan 
kebutuhan dari investor. bisa jadi investor membutuhkan lebih besar dari jumlah yang disarankan 
oleh 
second layer. 
} 
level Non Cash Assets { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
init 0<<rupiah>> 
inflow { autodef  Acquisition } 
outflow { autodef  Liquidation } 
doc asset ini termasuk, raw materials, wip, finished good, inventory, fixed asset, other asset 
} 
const Normal Net Acquisition Margin { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
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init 7% 
} 
const Normal Net Liquidation Margin { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
init 7% 
} 
const Normal New Agreement per person { 
autotype Real 
autounit agreement/ppl 
init 1<<agreement/ppl>> 
} 
level Number of Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit agreement 
init 'Normal New Agreement per person'*'Person with Positive Reputation and Personality hold 
Agreement' 
outflow { autodef  'End Agreement' } 
inflow { autodef  'New Agreement' } 
} 
level Paid Back Capital { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
init 0.1<<rupiah>> 
inflow { autodef  'Profit Shared to Investor' } 
inflow { autodef  'Capital Liquidation' } 
} 
level Person with Positive Reputation and Personality { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl 
init 100<<ppl>> 
inflow { autodef  'Net Additon to PRP' } 
outflow { autodef  'Persons Sign Agremeent' } 
} 
level Person with Positive Reputation and Personality hold Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl 
init 80<<ppl>> 
inflow { autodef  'Persons Sign Agremeent' } 
outflow { autodef  'Persons End Agreement' } 
} 
5aux Persons End Agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl/yr 
def 'End Agreement'/'Normal New Agreement per person' 
} 
aux Persons Sign Agremeent { 
autotype Real 
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autounit ppl/yr 
def 'New Agreement'/'Normal New Agreement per person' 
} 
const Population { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl 
init 50000000<<ppl>> 
} 
level Potential Positive Person Reputation { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl 
init 1000000<<ppl>> 
outflow { autodef  'Net Additon to PRP' } 
inflow { autodef  'Persons End Agreement' } 
} 
level Potential Reputation { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
outflow { autodef  'Net Reputation Change' } 
} 
aux Profit Shared to Investor { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/yr 
def IF('Cash Withdrawal'<0<<rupiah/yr>>,'Cash Withdrawal'*100%,'Cash Withdrawal'*'Investor 
Profit Sharing 
Percentage') 
} 
aux Rate_3 { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def Rate_4+(Cash*'Acq Cost'/Constant_3) 
} 
aux Rate_4 { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def Cash*(1-'Acq Cost')/Constant_3 
} 
aux Rate_5 { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def sales*(1+'liq Frac') 
} 
aux Rate_6 { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def Rate_5-sales-(Cash*'Acq Cost'/Constant_3) 
} 
level Retained Earning { 
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autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
init 0<<rupiah>> 
inflow { autodef  'Net Profit' } 
outflow { autodef  'Cash Withdrawal' } 
} 
aux Revenue { 
6autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def (1+'Actual Net Liquidation Margin')*Liquidation 
} 
aux sales { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def Asset/Constant_3 
} 
aux Second Layer of Referencing { 
autotype Real 
autounit ppl/mo 
def ('Person with Positive Reputation and Personality hold Agreement')*'Person with Positive 
Reputation and 
Personality'/Population*'Internship Effectifness'*'Meeting Intesity_Interneship' 
} 
const Time require for an agreement { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 4<<mo>> 
} 
const Time to Review Reputation { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 1<<mo>> 
} 
aux Total Assets { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
def 'Cash Asets'+'Non Cash Assets' 
} 
aux Total Equity { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah 
def Capital+'Retained Earning' 
} 
aux Total Margin { 
autotype Real 
autounit rupiah/mo 
def 'Margin From Acquisition of Asset'+'Margin from Liquidation Asset' 
} 
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aux Total time capital been invested { 
autotype Real 
unit mo 
def TIME-STARTTIME+.0000001<<da>> 
} 
const Updating Database Time { 
autotype Real 
init 20 
} 
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APPENDIX 4: Simulation Equation of Policy Cycle Model 
mainmodel Component 1 { 
aux Actual Intensity reduction fraction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/wk 
def 'Effect of PAIN to reduction of normal intensity'*'Normal Intensity Reduction' 
} 
aux Actual time to adjust delivery { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
def 'Effect od ITC to Adjustment rate'*'Normal Time to adjust delivery' 
} 
aux Actual Time to Adjust MII { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
def 'Effect of Pressure on PA to Take initiatives on Time to Adjust MII'*'Time to adjust MII' 
} 
aux Addition in Implementation team Capability { 
autotype Real 
autounit da^-1 
def Induction/'Induction time intensity'*'Implementation team Capability'*'Potential 
Implementation team 
Capability' 
} 
aux Addition to Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def 'Effet of Policy Options to The Credibility on MSC'*MAX(0,'Ministrial Interest on 
Initiatives')*'Working Time 
for MSC'/'Time to revise Credibility'*'Potential Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee' 
} 
aux Adjustment Rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/mo 
def 'Delivery GAP'/'Actual time to adjust delivery'*'Time allocated' 
} 
level Againts Legislative member { 
autotype Real 
autounit person 
init 50<<person>> 
inflow { autodef  'Opposing rate' } 
outflow { autodef  'Understanding rate' } 
} 
const Againts Lobby Effectiveness { 
autotype Real 
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init .1 
} 
aux Againts Lobbying { 
autotype Real 
autounit person/mo 
def 'Againts Legislative member'*('Supportive Legislative member'/'Legislative member')*'Againts 
Lobby 
Effectiveness'*'Againts meeting intensity' 
} 
aux Againts meeting intensity { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def GRAPH('Contradiction Opposition Party Point of 
View',0,.1,{0,2.55,3.5,3.94,4.26,4.55,4.74,4.87,4.97,5,5// 
Min:0;Max:5//})*'Normal Againts meeting'*'Public Perception' 
} 
aux Auxiliary_1 { 
autotype Real 
def 1/15 
} 
aux Auxiliary_2 { 
1autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012.53<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.62<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Auxiliary_3 { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012.5<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.53<<@yr>>) 
} 
const Average Contribution on Policy Option from a Submission { 
autotype Real 
autounit option/unit 
init 1<<option/unit>> 
} 
aux Average Pressure on Public Adm to take initiatives { 
autotype Real 
def ('Effect of Supportive poll to Gov'/2*'Normal pressure from poll'+'Effect of IPE projrction to 
Average 
Pressure'*'Normal pressure from IPE Projection')/2 
doc supaya dalam skala 1 maka efek dari poll buat pemerintah yang maksimum 2 dibagi 2. 
kemudian 
ditambhakan dengan efek yang datang dari IPE dan dirata-rata kan (atau dibagi 2) 
} 
level Broad Agreement on Issues Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Change in Broad Agreement on Issues' } 
} 
const Budget allocated { 
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autotype Real 
init 2 
} 
aux Budget Gap { 
} 
aux Budget Spent { 
autotype Real 
autounit euro 
def 'Normal average budget spent per 1% delivery'*Delivery*'Effect of ITC to Average Budget 
spent per 
delivery' 
} 
aux Budget Spent in First Phase { 
} 
aux Budget Spent to Expected Ratio { 
autotype Real 
def 'Budget Spent'/'Expected Current Phase Budget Spent'*'Time allocated' 
} 
aux Cabinet meeting positive gesture { 
autotype Real 
def 'effect of Total budget allocated to cabinet meeting positive gesture'*'Credibility Ministrial 
Steering 
Committee' 
} 
aux Change in Broad Agreement on Issues { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def 'Effect of Interest GAP on Change in Broad Agreement'/'Time To Change in BA'*'Time 
allocated for broad 
agreement_departmental task force'*'Potential Broad Agreement on Issues Initiatives' 
} 
aux Change in Point of View { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def ('Incumbent Party Electability projection'-'Contradiction Opposition Party Point of 
View')/'Time to review 
point of view'*'Potential Contradiction Opposition Party Point of View' 
} 
aux Clarifying Objectives { 
autotype Real 
2def ('Confidence on Key Policy Questions'+'Government Perception')/2*'Working Time for 
Clarifying 
Objectives'*'Potential Objectives clarified' 
zeroorder 
} 
level Confidence on Criterion Selection { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
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inflow { autodef  'Criterion Finding' } 
} 
level Confidence on Key Policy Questions { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Effort on Key Policy Searching' } 
} 
level Confidence on Policy Decision { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Effort on policy decision' } 
} 
level Confidence on Positive Policy Analysis { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Effort on Positive Policy Analysis' } 
} 
const Constant_1 { 
autotype Real 
init .3 
} 
level Contradiction Opposition Party Point of View { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
inflow { autodef  'Change in Point of View' } 
} 
aux Copy of Time allocated { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2013<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2014<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Copy of Working Time for MSC { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2013<<@yr>>) 
} 
level Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
inflow { autodef  'Addition to Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee' } 
} 
aux Criterion Finding { 
autotype Real 
autounit da^-1 
def 'Cabinet meeting positive gesture'*'Deadline to Find Criterion'/'Working time intensity to Find 
Criterion'* 
'Potential Confidence on Criterion Selection' 
} 
aux Deadline to Decide Policy { 
autotype Real 
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def 0+STEP(1,2012.7<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.98<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Deadline to Detail Policy { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012.98<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2013.1<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Deadline to Find Criterion { 
3autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012.6<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.7<<@yr>>) 
} 
level Delivery { 
autotype Real 
unit % 
init .00001 
inflow { autodef  'Adjustment Rate' } 
} 
aux Delivery GAP { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
def 'Expected Delivery'-Delivery 
} 
level Detail Policy Operational { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Policy Operational in Detail' } 
} 
aux Effect Findings GAP to Standard Press Coverage { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Perception GAP',0,.5,{1,1.23,1.6,2.32,3.9,6,6.83,7.37,7.64,7.77,7.77//Min:1;Max:8//}) 
} 
aux Effect od ITC to Adjustment rate { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Implementation team 
Capability',0,.1,{1.48,1.47,1.45,1.39,1.26,0.99,0.83,0.7,0.59,0.55,0.53// 
Min:0.5;Max:1.5//}) 
} 
aux effect of Delivery GAP to positive submission on Policy Evaluation { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Delivery 
GAP',0,.1,{1,0.994,0.99,0.98,0.95,0.88,0.806,0.73,0.59,0.43,0.2//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of DPO to Expected Delivery { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Detail Policy Operational',0,.1,{0,0.1,0.31,0.72,0.95,1,1,1,1,1,1//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of Informed Public on Supportive Poll { 
autotype Real 
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def GRAPH('Informed Public_information publicly 
available',0,.1,{0.006,0.3,0.43,0.48,0.49,0.5,0.503,0.516,0. 
54,0.67,1//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of Interest GAP on Change in Broad Agreement { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Interest 
GAP',0,.1,{0.5,0.326,0.213,0.126,0.065,0.045,0.026,0.02,0.013,0.006,0.005//Min:0;Max: 
0.5//}) 
} 
aux Effect of IPE projrction to Average Pressure { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Incumbent Party Electability 
projection',0,.1,{1,0.98,0.955,0.91,0.845,0.77,0.67,0.5,0.3,0.15,0. 
08//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of IS on effort to extract policy option from Submission { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Interdepartment 
Solidity_IS',0,.1,{1,0.955,0.903,0.82,0.72,0.555,0.35,0.16,0.08,0.04,0.01//Min:0; 
Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of IS to New Positive Submission { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def GRAPH('Interdepartment 
Solidity_IS',0,.1,{0,0.06,0.14,0.22,0.34,0.48,0.71,1.11,1.61,1.91,2//Min:0;Max:2// 
}<<unit>>) 
4} 
aux Effect of ITC to Average Budget spent per delivery { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Implementation team 
Capability',0,.1,{2,1.78,1.63,1.555,1.516,1.5,1.465,1.42,1.355,1.226,1// 
Min:1;Max:2//}) 
} 
aux Effect of PAIN to Normal Information Fullfilment per report { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Publicly available Information Need'/'Normal Public information 
need',0,0.1,{0,0.374,0.58,0.75,0. 
845,0.91,0.955,0.98,0.99,1,1//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of PAIN to reduction of normal intensity { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Publicly available Information Need'/'Normal Public information 
need',0,0.1,{1,0.6,0.355,0.21,0. 
135,0.084,0.06,0.045,0.04,0.026,0.02//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of Policy Analysis on IS { 
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autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Confidence on Positive Policy 
Analysis',0,2,{0,0.58,0.89,1.15,1.34,1.51,1.66,1.78,1.87,1.96,2// 
Min:0;Max:2//}) 
} 
aux Effect of Pressure on PA to Take initiatives on Time to Adjust MII { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Average Pressure on Public Adm to take 
initiatives',0,.1,{1,0.697,0.59,0.55,0.52,0.5,0.465,0.42, 
0.355,0.26,0.1//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Effect of Public Discourse Intensity to Net Positive Submission { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
def GRAPH('Public discourse 
intensity',0,.1,{0.02,0.77,1.35,1.76,2,2.1,2.1,2.2,2.57,3.7,7//Min:0;Max:7//}<< 
unit>>) 
} 
aux Effect of Public Interest on Supportive Poll { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Public Interest on 
Initiatives',0,.1,{0.14,0.57,0.77,0.9,0.97,1.02,1.06,1.12,1.24,1.46,1.81//Min:0; 
Max:2//}) 
} 
aux effect of RBS to Positive Submission on Policy Evaluation { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Budget Spent to Expected 
Ratio',0.5,.1,{0.8,0.912,0.963,0.986,0.997,1,0.997,0.986,0.963,0.912, 
0.8//Min:0.8;Max:1//}) 
} 
const Effect of report to public intensity addition { 
autotype Real 
autounit report^-1 
init .001 <<1/report>> 
} 
aux Effect of Supportive poll to Gov { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Supportive Poll',0,.1,{0,.04,0.12,0.27,0.55,1,1.45,1.73,1.88,1.96,2//Min:0;Max:2//}) 
} 
aux effect of Total budget allocated to cabinet meeting positive gesture { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Total Budget 
Allocated',1000000<<euro>>,1000000<<euros>>,{1,1.24,1.49,1.73,2//Min:1;Max:2/ 
/}) 
} 
aux Effet of Policy Options to The Credibility on MSC { 
autotype Real 
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def GRAPH('Proposed Policy 
Options',0<<option>>,1<<option>>,{0,0.845,1,0.955,0.87,0.8,0.69,0.516,0.33,0. 
2,0.2//Min:0;Max:1//}) 
} 
5aux Effort on Key Policy Searching { 
autotype Real 
def ('Weight on Steering Committe'*'Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee'+'Weight on 
Supportive External 
Review Report on Past Policy'*'Supportive External Review Report on Past Policy')*'Working Time 
for Key 
Policy Searching'*'Potential Confidence on Key Policy Questions' 
zeroorder 
} 
aux Effort on policy decision { 
autotype Real 
autounit da^-1 
def 'Confidence on Criterion Selection'*'Deadline to Decide Policy'/'Working time intensity to 
decide Policy'* 
'Potential Confidence on Policy Decision' 
} 
aux Effort on Policy Options Extraction { 
autotype Real 
autounit option/mo 
def 'Effect of IS on effort to extract policy option from Submission'*DELAYINF('Net Positive 
Submission','Time 
to Extract')*'Average Contribution on Policy Option from a Submission'*'Objectives clarified' 
} 
aux Effort on Positive Policy Analysis { 
autotype Real 
def 'Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee'*'Supportive External Review Report on Past 
Policy'*'Working 
Time for Policy Analysis'*'Potential Confidence Positive Policy Analysis' 
zeroorder 
} 
aux Evaluation Time { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2014<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2015<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Expected Current Phase Budget Spent { 
autotype Real 
autounit euro 
def Delivery*'Normal average budget spent per 1% delivery' 
} 
aux Expected Delivery { 
autotype Real 
unit % 
def 'Effect of DPO to Expected Delivery'*'Normal Expected Delivery' 
} 
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aux Expected Final Output { 
} 
aux Expected Output { 
} 
aux Expected Process { 
} 
aux Facts on Positive Policy Evaluation { 
autotype Real 
def 'Potential Positive Policy Evaluation Report'*(('effect of Delivery GAP to positive submission on 
Policy 
Evaluation'+'effect of RBS to Positive Submission on Policy Evaluation')/2)*'Public discourse 
intensity'* 
'Evaluation Time' 
zeroorder 
} 
aux Final Output Gap { 
} 
aux Finalizing Implementation { 
} 
aux Finalizing Impllementation Time { 
} 
aux Fulfilment per report { 
autotype Real 
autounit report^-1 
6def 'Effect of PAIN to Normal Information Fullfilment per report'*'Normal Information Fulfilment 
per report' 
} 
level Government Perception { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
inflow { autodef  'Net change Gov Perception rate' } 
} 
aux Implementation in Progress_Time { 
} 
level Implementation team Capability { 
autotype Real 
init 0.1 
inflow { autodef  'Addition in Implementation team Capability' } 
} 
level Incumbent Party Electability projection { 
autotype Real 
init .4 
inflow { autodef  'Net Change on IPE' } 
} 
aux Induction { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Credibility Ministrial Steering 
Committee',0,.1,{0,0.0026,0.007,0.017,0.03,0.049,0.071,0.088,0. 
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0974,0.1,0.1//Min:0;Max:0.1//}) 
} 
const Induction time intensity { 
autotype Real 
autounit da 
init 10<<da>> 
} 
aux Information fulfillment rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit wk^-1 
def 'Fulfilment per report'*'Related issues report'/'Time to report' 
} 
level Informed Public_information publicly available { 
autotype Real 
init .01 
inflow { autodef  'Information fulfillment rate' } 
} 
const Interdepartment Interest Friction { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
} 
aux Interdepartment Solidity_IS { 
autotype Real 
def 'Effect of Policy Analysis on IS'/'Interdepartment Interest Friction' 
} 
aux Interest GAP { 
autotype Real 
def ABS('Public Interest on Initiatives'-'Ministrial Interest on Initiatives') 
} 
const Interest pressure release { 
autotype Real 
init .15 
} 
aux Issues clarity { 
autotype Real 
def GRAPH('Public discourse 
intensity',0,.1,{0.99,0.974,0.935,0.85,0.73,0.59,0.445,0.3,0.16,0.065,0.03//Min: 
0;Max:1//}) 
} 
aux Legislative Approval { 
7autotype Real 
unit % 
def 'Supportive Legislative member'/'Legislative member' 
} 
const Legislative member { 
autotype Real 
autounit person 
init 100<<person>> 
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} 
aux Lobbying Period { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2016<<@yr>>) 
} 
const Maksimum Normatif Interest on Initiative { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
} 
aux Meeting intensity { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def GRAPH('Credibility Ministrial Steering 
Committee',0,.1,{0,2.55,3.5,3.94,4.26,4.55,4.74,4.87,4.97,5,5//Min: 
0;Max:5//})*'Normal meeting intensity' 
} 
level Ministrial Interest on Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
init .001 
inflow { autodef  'Net Change in Ministrial Interest on Initiatives' } 
} 
aux Net change Gov Perception rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def ('Issues clarity'*'Pressure Group Perception')/1<<yr>> 
} 
aux Net Change in Ministrial Interest on Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def (DELAYINF('Public Interest on Initiatives','Time to Observed PII')-'Ministrial Interest on 
Initiatives')/'Actual 
Time to Adjust MII'+'Net change Gov Perception rate'*'Potential Ministrial Interest on Initiatives' 
} 
aux Net Change in Public Interest on Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
autounit wk^-1 
def ('Information fulfillment rate')*'Potential Public Interest on Initiatives'/'Maksimum Normatif 
Interest on 
Initiative'*'Public Interest on Initiatives' 
} 
aux Net Change on IPE { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr^-1 
def 'Public Perception'/'Time to revise IPE'*'Potential Addition Incumbent Party Electability 
projection' 
} 
aux Net Positive Submission { 
autotype Real 
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autounit unit/mo 
def (('Effect of IS to New Positive Submission'+'Effect of Public Discourse Intensity to Net Positive 
Submission')/'Submission time')*'Submission Deadline'*'Broad Agreement on Issues Initiatives' 
} 
aux Net Pressure of Pressure Group { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def 'Pressure addition rate'-'Pressure reduction rate' 
} 
8const Normal Againts meeting { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
init 2<<1/mo>> 
} 
const Normal average budget spent per 1% delivery { 
autotype Real 
autounit euro 
init 50000<<euro>>/1<<%>> 
} 
const Normal Expected Delivery { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
} 
const Normal Information Fulfilment per report { 
autotype Real 
autounit report^-1 
init 0.0015<<1/report>> 
} 
const Normal Intensity Reduction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/wk 
init 20<<%/wk>> 
} 
const Normal meeting intensity { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
init 1<<1/mo>> 
} 
const Normal pressure from IPE Projection { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
} 
const Normal pressure from poll { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
} 
const Normal Public information need { 
autotype Real 
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init .5 
} 
const Normal Time to adjust delivery { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 4<<mo>> 
} 
const Normal total report in one edition { 
autotype Real 
autounit report 
init 2<<report/%>> 
} 
level Objectives clarified { 
autotype Real 
init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Clarifying Objectives' } 
} 
aux Opposing rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit person/mo 
def MAX(0<<person/mo>>,('Againts Lobbying'))*'Lobbying Period' 
} 
9aux Output Gap { 
} 
aux Perception GAP { 
autotype Real 
def MAX('Government Perception','Pressure Group Perception')-MIN('Government 
Perception','Pressure 
Group Perception') 
} 
level Policy Implementatated First Phase { 
inflow { autodef  'Policy Implementation completes' } 
} 
aux Policy Implementation completes { 
} 
level Policy Implemented { 
inflow { autodef  'Finalizing Implementation' } 
} 
aux Policy Operational in Detail { 
autotype Real 
autounit da^-1 
def IF('Legislative Approval'>.5,'Confidence on Policy Decision'*'Implementation team 
Capability',0)/'Working 
time intensity to operationalize policy'*'Deadline to Detail Policy'*'Potential in Detail Policy 
Operational' 
} 
level Positive Policy Evaluation Report { 
autotype Real 
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init 0 
inflow { autodef  'Facts on Positive Policy Evaluation' } 
} 
level Positive Submission { 
autotype Real 
autounit unit 
init 0<<unit>> 
inflow { autodef  'Net Positive Submission' } 
} 
level Potential Addition Incumbent Party Electability projection { 
autotype Real 
init .6 
outflow { autodef  'Net Change on IPE' } 
} 
level Potential Broad Agreement on Issues Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Change in Broad Agreement on Issues' } 
} 
level Potential Confidence on Criterion Selection { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Criterion Finding' } 
} 
level Potential Confidence on Key Policy Questions { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Effort on Key Policy Searching' } 
} 
level Potential Confidence on Policy Decision { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Effort on policy decision' } 
} 
level Potential Confidence Positive Policy Analysis { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Effort on Positive Policy Analysis' } 
10} 
level Potential Contradiction Opposition Party Point of View { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
outflow { autodef  'Change in Point of View' } 
} 
level Potential Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
outflow { autodef  'Addition to Credibility Ministrial Steering Committee' } 
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} 
level Potential Implementation team Capability { 
autotype Real 
init .9 
outflow { autodef  'Addition in Implementation team Capability' } 
} 
level Potential in Detail Policy Operational { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Policy Operational in Detail' } 
} 
level Potential Ministrial Interest on Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
init .999 
outflow { autodef  'Net Change in Ministrial Interest on Initiatives' } 
} 
level Potential Objectives clarified { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Clarifying Objectives' } 
} 
level Potential Positive Policy Evaluation Report { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
outflow { autodef  'Facts on Positive Policy Evaluation' } 
} 
level Potential Public Interest on Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
outflow { autodef  'Net Change in Public Interest on Initiatives' } 
} 
aux Press Coverage { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
def 'Effect Findings GAP to Standard Press Coverage'*'Standard Press Coverage' 
} 
aux Pressure addition rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def ('Government Perception'*-('Issues clarity'))/1<<mo>> 
} 
level Pressure Group Perception { 
autotype Real 
init 1 
inflow { autodef  'Pressure addition rate' } 
outflow { autodef  'Pressure reduction rate' } 
} 
aux Pressure reduction rate { 
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autotype Real 
autounit mo^-1 
def ('Interest pressure release'*'Pressure Group Perception')/1<<mo>> 
11} 
aux Process Gap { 
} 
level Proposed Policy Options { 
autotype Real 
autounit option 
init 0<<option>> 
inflow { autodef  'Effort on Policy Options Extraction' } 
} 
level Public discourse intensity { 
autotype Real 
init .1 
inflow { autodef  'Public discourse intensity addition' } 
outflow { autodef  'Public discourse intensity reduction' } 
} 
aux Public discourse intensity addition { 
autotype Real 
unit %/wk 
def 'Related issues report'/'Time to report'*'Effect of report to public intensity addition' 
} 
aux Public discourse intensity reduction { 
autotype Real 
autounit %/wk 
def 'Public discourse intensity'*'Actual Intensity reduction fraction' 
} 
aux Public Expectation on Output { 
} 
level Public Interest on Initiatives { 
autotype Real 
init .5 
inflow { autodef  'Net Change in Public Interest on Initiatives' } 
} 
aux Public Perception { 
autotype Real 
def DELAYINF('Positive Policy Evaluation Report',6<<mo>>) 
zeroorder 
} 
level Publicly available Information Need { 
autotype Real 
init .99 
outflow { autodef  'Information fulfillment rate' } 
} 
aux Related issues report { 
autotype Real 
autounit report 
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def 'Normal total report in one edition'*'Press Coverage' 
} 
const Standard Press Coverage { 
autotype Real 
autounit % 
init 2<<%>> 
} 
aux Submission Deadline { 
autotype Real 
def 1+STEP(-1,2012.2<<@yr>>) 
} 
const Submission time { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init .5<<mo>> 
} 
12const Supportive External Review Report on Past Policy { 
autotype Real 
init .03 
} 
level Supportive Legislative member { 
autotype Real 
autounit person 
init 50<<person>> 
outflow { autodef  'Opposing rate' } 
inflow { autodef  'Understanding rate' } 
} 
const Supportive Lobby Effectiveness { 
autotype Real 
init .05 
} 
aux Supportive Lobbying { 
autotype Real 
autounit person/mo 
def 'Supportive Legislative member'*('Againts Legislative member'/'Legislative 
member')*'Supportive Lobby 
Effectiveness'*'Meeting intensity' 
} 
aux Supportive Poll { 
autotype Real 
def 'Effect of Informed Public on Supportive Poll'*'Effect of Public Interest on Supportive Poll'/2 
} 
aux Time allocated { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2013<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2014<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Time allocated for broad agreement_departmental task force { 
autotype Real 
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def 0+STEP(1,2011<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012<<@yr>>) 
} 
const Time to adjust MII { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 1<<mo>> 
} 
const Time To Change in BA { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 1<<mo>> 
} 
const Time to Extract { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 2<<mo>> 
} 
const Time to Observed PII { 
autotype Real 
autounit wk 
init 1<<wk>> 
} 
const Time to report { 
autotype Real 
autounit wk 
init 1<<wk>> 
} 
const Time to review point of view { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
13init 5<<mo>> 
} 
const Time to revise Credibility { 
autotype Real 
autounit mo 
init 2<<mo>> 
} 
const Time to revise IPE { 
autotype Real 
autounit yr 
init 2<<yr>> 
} 
aux Total Budget Allocated { 
autotype Real 
autounit euro 
def 'Expected Delivery'*'Normal average budget spent per 1% delivery' 
} 
aux Total Budget Spent { 
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} 
aux Total Implementation Time { 
} 
aux Understanding rate { 
autotype Real 
autounit person/mo 
def MAX(0<<person/mo>>,('Supportive Lobbying'))*'Lobbying Period' 
} 
const Weight on Steering Committe { 
autotype Real 
init .3 
} 
aux Weight on Supportive External Review Report on Past Policy { 
autotype Real 
def 1-'Weight on Steering Committe' 
} 
aux Working Period of IS { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2011.1<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Working Time for Clarifying Objectives { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012.1<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.2<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Working Time for Key Policy Searching { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.1<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Working Time for MSC { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2013<<@yr>>) 
} 
aux Working Time for Policy Analysis { 
autotype Real 
def 0+STEP(1,2012<<@yr>>)+STEP(-1,2012.6<<@yr>>) 
} 
const Working time intensity to decide Policy { 
autotype Real 
autounit da 
init 15<<da>> 
} 
const Working time intensity to Find Criterion { 
autotype Real 
14autounit da 
init 10<<da>> 
} 
const Working time intensity to operationalize policy { 
autotype Real 
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autounit da 
init 2<<da>> 
} 
